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What is the relationship between degrees of belief (also known as credences) and binary
beliefs (also known as beliefs simpliciter)? Can the latter be expressed as a function of the
former, and if so, what does this function look like? We call this the belief-binarization
problem. This problem, which has recently received renewed attention, is known to gen-
erate some notorious paradoxes, including the well-known “lottery paradox”, discussed
below.1 The aim of this paper is to investigate the belief-binarization problem from a
slightly di↵erent perspective: that of judgment-aggregation theory. This is the branch
of social choice theory that focuses on how a group or committee can arrive at collective
judgments on some propositions on the basis of its members’ individual judgments.2
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Probabilistic Reasoning,” Journal of Philosophical Logic, XLI, 6 (December 2012): 957–81; and “A Geo-
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Although—on the face of it—judgment aggregation and belief binarization are very dif-
ferent problems, we show that there are strong formal connections between the two, and
important lessons for belief binarization can be learnt from judgment-aggregation theory.
Specifically, once the formal apparatus of judgment-aggregation theory is suitably
adapted, the impossibility and possibility theorems of judgment aggregation have im-
mediate consequences for belief binarization. At the centre of this paper is a baseline
impossibility theorem, which we use to map out the space of possible solutions to the
belief-binarization problem. The theorem shows that there exists no belief-binarization
rule satisfying four initially plausible desiderata, except in limiting cases. To find a work-
able belief-binarization rule, we must therefore give up at least one of these desiderata. It
is then illuminating to explore the resulting trade-o↵s. Surprisingly, our central theorem
is closely related to Arrow’s classic impossibility theorem in social choice theory.
Some similarities between belief binarization and judgment aggregation—and espe-
cially between the paradoxes in the two domains—have been investigated before.3 But
the focus has typically been on identifying lessons for judgment aggregation that can
be learnt from belief binarization, not the other way round.4 So far, there has been no
comprehensive study of the reverse direction of transfer. We seek to fill this gap.5
1 An Overview
We routinely make belief ascriptions of two kinds. We speak of an agent’s degrees of
belief in some propositions and also of the agent’s beliefs simpliciter. On the standard
picture, degrees of belief (also known as credences, partial beliefs, or quantitative beliefs)
take the form of subjective probabilities the agent assigns to the propositions in question,
3See especially Isaac Levi, “List and Pettit,” Synthese, CXL, 1–2 (May 2004): 237–42; Igor Douven
and Jan-Willem Romeijn, “The Discursive Dilemma as a Lottery Paradox,” Economics and Philoso-
phy, XXIII, 3 (November 2007): 301–19; and Kevin T. Kelly and Hanti Lin, “Judgment Aggregation:
A Geometrical Impossibility Proof,” Presentation at the 2011 Episteme Conference, Carnegie Mellon
University (June 2011).
4A notable exception, which came to our attention as we were revising this paper, is Jake Chandler,
“Acceptance, Aggregation and Scoring Rules,” Erkenntnis, LXXVIII, 1 (February 2013): 201–17. Chan-
dler derives lessons for belief binarization from “distance-based” judgment aggregation. We return to
this in Section 8.2.
5Douven and Romeijn’s paper, “The Discursive Dilemma as a Lottery Paradox” (op. cit.), concludes
with an invitation to conduct the kind of study we embark on here: “given the liveliness of the debate on
judgement aggregation, and the many new results that keep coming out of that, it is not unrealistic to
expect that at least some theorems originally derived, or still to be derived, within that context can be
applied fruitfully to the context of the lottery paradox, and will teach us something new, and hopefully
also important, about this paradox” (p. 318).
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for example a subjective probability of 12 for the proposition that a coin, which has been
tossed but not yet observed, has landed “heads”. Beliefs (also known as full or all-out
beliefs, binary beliefs, or qualitative beliefs) take the form of the agent’s overall acceptance
of some propositions and non-acceptance of others, such as when one accepts that the
Earth is round or that 2+2=4, but not that there are trees on Mars. The agent’s belief
set consists of all the propositions that he or she accepts in this all-or-nothing sense.
We call a function that takes degrees of belief as input and returns binary beliefs as
output a belief-binarization rule.6 Our question is whether there are any plausible belief-
binarization rules and what they look like. A widely studied class of belief-binarization
rules is the class of threshold rules, according to which an agent believes a proposition
(in the binary sense) if and only if he or she has a high-enough degree of belief in
it. Threshold rules, however, run into the well-known lottery paradox.7 Suppose, for
example, that an agent believes of each lottery ticket among a million tickets that this
ticket will not win, since his or her degree of belief in this proposition is 0.999999, which,
for the sake of argument, counts as “high enough”. The believed propositions then imply
that no ticket will win. But the agent knows that this is false and has a degree of belief
of 1 in its negation: some ticket will win. This illustrates that, under a threshold rule,
the agent’s belief set may be neither implication-closed (some implications of believed
propositions are not believed) nor logically consistent (some beliefs contradict others).8
Now let’s compare this with the problem of judgment aggregation. Here, the key
question is how several individuals’ judgments on some propositions can be aggregated
into collective judgments.9 A multi-member court, for example, may have to aggre-
6The term “belief binarization” captures the idea that we are looking for a function that takes
non-binary beliefs (that is, degrees of belief) as input and delivers binary beliefs as output; it thereby
“binarizes” its non-binary inputs. However, readers who do not like the term “belief binarization” may
alternatively speak of “belief identification”. We thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.
7Henry E. Kyburg, Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief (Middletown: Wesleyan University
Press, 1961).
8The works cited in footnote 1 are all responses to this problem. Leitgeb argues that rational belief
corresponds to the assignment of a stably high rational degree of belief, where this is a joint constraint on
degrees of belief and beliefs, not a reduction of one to the other. Lin and Kelly use geometric and logical
ideas to defend a class of belief-acceptance rules that avoid the lottery paradox, and explore whether
reasoning with beliefs can track reasoning with degrees of belief. Hawthorne and Bovens discuss how to
make threshold rules consistent. Douven and Williamson prove that belief-binarization rules based on
a “structural” criterion for the acceptance of any proposition must require a threshold of 1 for belief or
fail to ensure consistency.
9See, for example, Christian List and Philip Pettit, “Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility
Result,” Economics and Philosophy, XVIII, 1 (April 2002): 89–110; Marc Pauly and Martin van Hees,
“Logical Constraints on Judgement Aggregation,” Journal of Philosophical Logic, XXXV, 6 (December
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gate several judges’ verdicts on whether a defendant did some action (proposition p),
whether that action was contractually prohibited (proposition q), and whether the de-
fendant is liable for breach of contract (for which the conjunction p^ q is necessary and
su cient). Finding plausible aggregation rules that secure consistent collective judg-
ments is surprisingly di cult. Majority rule, the best known aggregation rule, is not
generally satisfactory. There might be a majority for p, a majority for q, and yet a ma-
jority against p ^ q, which illustrates that majority rule may fail to produce consistent
and implication-closed collective judgments. This is reminiscent of the lottery paradox,
where a threshold rule fails to secure consistent and implication-closed beliefs.
We show that this reminiscence is not accidental: there is a formal correspondence
between the problem of belief binarization and that of judgment aggregation. As we
will explain, the former can be translated into a particular instance of the latter, so that
many insights from the domain of judgment aggregation carry over to the domain of
belief binarization. Using this translation scheme, we prove a “baseline” impossibility
theorem, which says that (except in limiting cases) there exists no belief-binarization
rule satisfying four formal desiderata:
(i) universal domain: the rule should always work;
(ii) consistency and completeness of beliefs: beliefs should be logically consistent and
complete, as explained in more detail later;
(iii) propositionwise independence: whether or not one believes each proposition should
depend only on the degree of belief in it, not on the degree of belief in others; and
(iv) certainty preservation: if the degrees of belief happen to take only the values 0 or
1 on all propositions, they should be preserved as the all-or-nothing beliefs.
The upshot is that any belief-binarization rule will satisfy at most three of the four
desiderata, and we assess the available possibilities below. For example, if we replace
2006): 569–85; Gabriella Pigozzi, “Belief Merging and the Discursive Dilemma: An Argument-based
Account to Paradoxes of Judgment Aggregation,” Synthese, CLII, 2 (September 2006): 285–98; Franz
Dietrich, “A generalised model of judgment aggregation,” Social Choice and Welfare, XXVIII, 4 (June
2007): 529–65; Franz Dietrich and Christian List, “Arrow’s Theorem in Judgment Aggregation,” Social
Choice and Welfare, XXIX, 1 (July 2007): 19–33; Klaus Nehring and Clemens Puppe, “Abstract Ar-
rowian Aggregation,” Journal of Economic Theory, CXLV, 2 (March 2010): 467–94; and Elad Dokow
and Ron Holzman, “Aggregation of Binary Evaluations,” Journal of Economic Theory, CXLV, 2 (March
2010): 495–511. This work was initially inspired by legal scholarship on the “doctrinal paradox,” such
as Lewis A. Kornhauser and Lawrence G. Sager, “Unpacking the Court,” Yale Law Journal, XCVI, 1
(November 1986): 82–117.
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the completeness requirement in desideratum (ii) with the requirement that beliefs be
closed under logical implication (but not necessarily complete), then the only possible
belief-binarization rule is the one that demands a degree of belief of 1 (“certainty”) for
belief simpliciter. This is no longer an impossibility, but still a triviality result.
Technically, our theorem is a corollary of the judgment-aggregation variant of Arrow’s
classic impossibility theorem in social choice theory.10 Originally proved for preference
aggregation, Arrow’s theorem asserts that there are no non-dictatorial methods of aggre-
gation that satisfy some plausible desiderata: informally, there is no perfect democratic
voting method. One of this paper’s lessons is that the Arrovian impossibility carries
over to the domain of belief binarization and, therefore, that the lottery paradox and
the paradoxes of social choice can be traced back to a common source.
What can we learn from this? Just as Arrow’s theorem establishes an inconsistency
between some plausible requirements of social choice, so our analysis establishes the
inconsistency between some desiderata on belief binarization that are, arguably, natural
starting points for any investigation of the problem. The tools we import from judgment-
aggregation theory allow us to pinpoint the precise (necessary and su cient) conditions
under which this inconsistency arises. This also allows us to characterize the limiting
cases in which the impossibility does not arise. Interestingly, the impossibility arises not
only when the domain of beliefs is an algebra of propositions (a standard assumption in
formal epistemology), but also for sets of propositions that are much less rich (in a sense
made precise in the Appendix). In sum, the conflict between the four desiderata is not
just an isolated artifact of a few lottery-paradox examples, but a very general problem.
Furthermore, just as Arrow’s theorem can be used to map out the space of possible
aggregation rules in social choice theory, so our result yields a very general taxonomy of
the space of possible solutions to the belief-binarization problem. As we will see, some of
those solutions are more compelling than others, and we suggest that the most palatable
(or least unpalatable) solutions involve relaxing propositionwise independence or (if we
wish to keep independence) weakening the closure requirements on beliefs.
More broadly, our investigation is relevant to some metaphysical, psychological, and
epistemological questions. We may be interested, for instance, in whether an agent plau-
sibly has both degrees of belief and binary beliefs, and/or whether one of the two kinds
10This variant of Arrow’s theorem was proved independently, in di↵erent frameworks, by Dietrich
and List, in “Arrow’s Theorem in Judgment Aggregation” (op. cit.), and Dokow and Holzman, in
“Aggregation of Binary Evaluations” (op. cit.), building on earlier work by Nehring and Puppe, reported
in “Abstract Arrowian Aggregation” (op. cit.). We discuss this result below. In footnote 68, we describe
the relationship between the Dietrich–List, Dokow–Holzman, and Nehring–Puppe versions. For Kenneth
Arrow’s original theorem, see Social Choice and Individual Values (New York: Wiley, 1951/1963).
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of belief—say, the binary one—is just a more coarse-grained version of the other and
perhaps reducible to it. Furthermore, even if neither kind of belief can be reduced to
the other, we may still be interested in whether there is some other systematic connec-
tion between the two—such as one of supervenience—or whether they are, in principle,
independent of one another. Finally, we may be interested in how rational beliefs re-
late to rational degrees of belief, even if, in the absence of rationality, the two could
come apart. Our formal analysis of the belief-binarization problem is relevant to all of
these questions. It can tell us what conditions the relationship between degrees of be-
lief and binary beliefs could, or could not, satisfy, thereby constraining the substantive
philosophical views one can consistently hold on this matter.
2 The Parallels between Belief Binarization and Judgment
Aggregation
To make the parallels between belief binarization and judgment aggregation more con-
crete, we begin with a standard example of a judgment-aggregation problem, which
echoes our earlier example of the multi-member court. Suppose a committee of three
experts has to make collective judgments on the propositions p, q, r, p ^ q ^ r, and
their negations on the basis of the committee members’ individual judgments. These
are as shown in Table 1. The di culty lies in the fact that there are majorities—in fact,
Table 1: A judgment-aggregation problem
p q r p ^ q ^ r ¬(p ^ q ^ r)
Individual 1 True True False False True
Individual 2 True False True False True
Individual 3 False True True False True
Proportion of support 23
2
3
2
3 0 1
two-thirds majorities—in support of each of p, q, and r, but the conjunction of these
propositions, p^q^r, is unanimously rejected and its negation, ¬(p^q^r), unanimously
accepted. Majority voting, or any supermajority rule under which a quota of 23 is su -
cient for the collective acceptance of any proposition, yields a set of accepted propositions
that is neither implication-closed (it fails to include p ^ q ^ r despite the inclusion of p,
q, and r) nor consistent (it includes all of p, q, r, and ¬(p^ q ^ r)). Such problems have
come to be known as discursive dilemmas, though they are perhaps best described sim-
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ply as majority inconsistencies.11 A central goal of the theory of judgment aggregation
is to find aggregation rules that generate consistent and/or implication-closed collective
judgments while also satisfying some other desiderata.12
A belief-binarization problem can take a similar form. Suppose an agent seeks to
arrive at binary beliefs on the propositions p, q, r, p^q^r, and their negations, based on
his or her degrees of belief. Suppose, specifically, the agent assigns an equal subjective
probability of 13 to each of three distinct possible worlds, in which p, q, and r have
di↵erent truth-values, as shown in Table 2. Each world renders two of p, q, and r true
and the other false. The bottom row of the table shows the agent’s overall degrees of
belief in the propositions. Here the di culty lies in the fact that while the agent has a
Table 2: A belief-binarization problem
p q r p ^ q ^ r ¬(p ^ q ^ r)
World 1 (subj. prob. 13) True True False False True
World 2 (subj. prob. 13) True False True False True
World 3 (subj. prob. 13) False True True False True
Degree of belief 23
2
3
2
3 0 1
relatively high degree of belief—namely 23—in each of p, q, and r, his or her degree of
belief in their conjunction is 0, and the degree of belief in its negation is 1. Any threshold
rule under which a degree of belief of 23 su ces for all-out belief in any proposition (and, a
fortiori, a rule with a “more-likely-than-not” threshold) yields a belief set that is neither
implication-closed nor consistent. On the other hand, if we demand a higher threshold
for including a proposition in the agent’s belief set, that belief set will include only
¬(p^ q ^ r) and will therefore be incomplete with respect to many proposition-negation
pairs—accepting neither p, nor ¬p, for instance. Other examples can be constructed in
which more demanding threshold rules also lead to inconsistencies.
If we identify voters in Table 1 with possible worlds in Table 2, the parallels be-
tween our two problems should be evident. In this simple analogy, possible worlds in a
belief-binarization problem play the role of individual voters in a judgment-aggregation
problem, and the agent’s degree of belief in any proposition plays the role of the propor-
tion of individuals accepting it. In fact, the function that assigns to each proposition in
a judgment-aggregation problem the proportion of individuals supporting it behaves for-
11The term “Discursive Dilemma” was introduced by Philip Pettit in “Deliberative Democracy and
the Discursive Dilemma,” Philosophical Issues, XI, 1 (October 2001): 268–99. Some much-discussed
examples go back to Kornhauser and Sager’s work, such as “Unpacking the court” (op. cit.).
12See, for example, List and Pettit, “Aggregating Sets of Judgments” (op. cit.).
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mally like a probability function over these propositions. Though it is interpretationally
di↵erent, it satisfies the constraints of probabilistic coherence (assuming individual judg-
ment sets are consistent and complete). This already suggests that belief-binarization
and judgment-aggregation problems are structurally similar.13
Yet, there is an important di↵erence in format. In a judgment-aggregation problem,
we are usually given the entire profile of individual judgments, that is, the full list
of the individuals’ judgment sets, as in the first three rows of Table 1. In a belief-
binarization-problem, by contrast, we are only given an agent’s degrees of belief in the
relevant propositions, that is, the last row of Table 2, summarizing his or her overall
subjective probabilities. The possible worlds underpinning these probabilities are hidden
from view. Thus the input to a belief-binarization problem corresponds, not to a full
profile of individual judgment sets, but to a propositionwise anonymous profile, that is, a
specification of the proportions of individuals supporting the various propositions under
consideration. This gives us, not a full table such as Table 1, but only its last row.14
Indeed, in our subsequent formal analysis, possible worlds drop out of the picture.
In sum, a belief-binarization problem corresponds to a propositionwise anonymous
judgment-aggregation problem, the problem of how to aggregate the final row of a table
such as Table 1 into a single judgment set. We can view this as an aggregation problem
with a special restriction: namely that when we determine the collective judgments, we
must pay attention only to the proportions of individuals supporting each proposition
and must disregard, for example, who holds which judgment set. A belief-binarization
problem will then have a solution of a certain kind if and only if the corresponding
propositionwise anonymous judgment-aggregation problem has a matching solution.
Of course, the theory of judgment aggregation has primarily focused, not on the
aggregation of propositionwise anonymous profiles (final rows of the relevant tables), but
on the aggregation of fully specified profiles (lists of judgment sets across all individuals,
13For earlier discussions of this similarity, see Levi, “List and Pettit” (op. cit.), Douven and Romeijn,
“The Discursive Dilemma as a Lottery Paradox” (op. cit.), and Chandler, “Acceptance, Aggregation
and Scoring Rules” (op. cit.).
14The notion of a propositionwise anonymous profile should not be confused with that of an anonymous
profile simpliciter. The former specifies the proportion of individuals supporting each proposition; the
latter specifies the proportion of individuals supporting each combination of judgments. The example
of Table 1 yields an anonymous profile in which the judgment sets {p,q,¬r,¬(p ^ q ^ r)}, {p,¬q,r,¬(p ^
q ^ r)}, and {¬p,q,r,¬(p ^ q ^ r)} are each supported by 13 of the individuals, which corresponds to a
propositionwise anonymous profile in which p, q, and r are each supported by 23 of the individuals, p^q^r
is supported by none of them, and ¬(p ^ q ^ r) is supported by all. Propositionwise anonymous profiles
correspond to equivalence classes of anonymous profiles, which correspond to equivalence classes of full
profiles. Degree-of-belief functions are structurally equivalent to propositionwise anonymous profiles.
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without the special restriction we have mentioned). We will see, however, that despite the
more restrictive informational basis of belief binarization several results from judgment-
aggregation theory carry over.15 We will now make this precise.
3 Belief Binarization Formalized
We first formalize the belief-binarization problem. Let X be the set of propositions
on which beliefs are held, where propositions are subsets of some underlying set of
worlds.16 We call X the proposition set. For the moment, our only assumption about
the proposition set is that it is non-empty and closed under negation (that is, for any
proposition p in X, its negation ¬p is also in X). In principle, the proposition set can
be an entire algebra of propositions, that is, a set of propositions that is closed under
negation and conjunction and thereby also under disjunction.
A degree-of-belief function is a function Cr that assigns to each proposition p in X
a number Cr(p) in the interval from 0 to 1, where this assignment is probabilistically
coherent.17 A belief set is a subset B ✓ X. It is called consistent if B is a consistent
set, complete (relative to X) if it contains a member of each proposition-negation pair
p,¬p in X, and implication-closed (relative to X) if it contains every proposition p in X
that is entailed by B. Consistency and completeness jointly imply implication-closure.
A belief-binarization rule for X is a function f that maps each degree-of-belief
function Cr on X (within some domain of admissible such functions) to a belief set
B = f(Cr). An important class of binarization rules is the class of threshold rules. Here
there exists some threshold t in [0, 1], which can be either strict or weak, such that, for
15Douven and Romeijn, in “The Discursive Dilemma as a Lottery Paradox” (op. cit.), and Kelly
and Lin, in “Judgment aggregation: A geometrical impossibility proof” (op. cit.), proceed the other
way round and derive some impossibility results for anonymous judgment aggregation from analogous
results on belief binarization. These results di↵er from the canonical “Arrovian” impossibility result on
judgment aggregation, on which we focus here (see Section 6 and the Appendix below). The latter result
cannot be derived from any belief-binarization results, given the richer informational basis of judgment
aggregation. (Belief binarization corresponds to propositionwise anonymous judgment aggregation.)
16The following definitions apply. Let ⌦ be some non-empty set of possible worlds. A proposition is
a subset p ✓ ⌦. For any proposition p, we write ¬p to denote the complement (negation) of p, that is,
⌦\p. For any two propositions p and q, we write p^ q to denote their intersection (conjunction), that is,
p \ q; and p _ q to denote their union (disjunction), that is, p [ q. A set S of propositions is consistent
if its intersection is non-empty, that is, \
p2S
p 6= Ø; S entails another proposition q if the intersection of
all propositions in S is a subset of q, that is, \
p2S
p ✓ q. A proposition p is tautological if p = ⌦ and
contradictory if p = Ø.
17Formally, Cr is a function from X into [0, 1] which is extendable to a probability function (with
standard properties) on the algebra generated by X (which is the smallest algebra including X).
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every admissible degree-of-belief function Cr, the belief set B is the following:
B = {p 2 X : Cr(p) exceeds t},
where “Cr(p) exceeds t” means
Cr(p) > t in the case of a strict threshold
and Cr(p)   t in the case of a weak threshold.
More generally, we can relativize thresholds and their designations as strict or weak to
the propositions in question. We must then replace t in the expressions above with
tp, the threshold for proposition p, where each proposition-specific threshold can again
be either strict or weak. If the threshold, or its designation as strict or weak, di↵ers
across propositions, we speak of a non-uniform threshold rule, to distinguish it from the
uniform rules with an identical threshold for all propositions. Threshold rules are by no
means the only possible belief-binarization rules; later, we consider other examples.
We now introduce four desiderata that we might, at least initially, expect a belief-
binarization rule to meet; we subsequently discuss their relaxation. The first desideratum
says that the belief-binarization rule should always work, no matter which degree-of-
belief function is fed into it as input.
Universal domain. The domain of f is the set of all degree-of-belief functions on X.
So, we are looking for a universally applicable solution to the belief-binarization problem.
Later, we also consider belief-binarization rules with restricted domains.
The second desideratum says that the belief set generated by the belief-binarization
rule should always be consistent and complete (relative to X).
Belief consistency and completeness. For every Cr in the domain of f , the belief
set B = f(Cr) is consistent and complete.
Consistency is a plausible requirement on a belief set B (though we consider its relax-
ation too), but one may object that completeness is too demanding, since it rules out
suspending belief on some proposition-negation pairs. Indeed, it would be implausible to
defend completeness as a general requirement of rationality. However, for the purpose of
characterizing the logical space of possible belief-binarization rules, it is a useful starting
point, though to be relaxed subsequently. Note, further, that the present requirement
demands completeness only relative to X, the proposition set under consideration.
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The third desideratum is another useful baseline requirement. It says that whether
or not one believes a given proposition p should depend only on the degree of belief in
p, not on the degree of belief in other propositions.
Propositionwise independence. For any Cr and Cr0 in the domain of f and any p
in X, if Cr(p) = Cr0(p) then p 2 B , p 2 B0, where B = f(Cr) and B0 = f(Cr0).
This rules out a “holistic” relationship between an agent’s degrees of belief and his or
her binary beliefs, where “holism” means that an agent’s belief concerning a proposition
p may depend on his or her degrees of belief in other propositions, not just in p. For
example, if we sought to “reduce” binary beliefs to degrees of belief, then this would be
easiest if an agent’s binary belief concerning any proposition p was simply a function
of his or her degree of belief in p. A holistic relationship between degrees of belief and
beliefs, by contrast, would rule out such a simple reduction. At best, we might achieve
a more complicated reduction, expressing an agent’s belief concerning each proposition
p as a function of his or her degrees of belief in a variety of other propositions. We later
discuss examples of holistic belief-binarization rules.
The final desideratum is quite minimal. It says that, in the highly special case in
which the degree-of-belief function is already binary (that is, it only ever assigns degrees
of belief 0 or 1 to the propositions in X), the resulting binary beliefs should be exactly
as specified by that degree-of-belief function.
Certainty preservation. For any Cr in the domain of f , if Cr already assigns extremal
degrees of belief (0 or 1) to all propositions in X, then, for every proposition p in X, B
contains p if Cr(p) = 1 and B does not contain p if Cr(p) = 0, where B = f(Cr).
Note that this desideratum imposes no restriction unless the degree-of-belief function
assigns extremal values to all propositions in X. So, for instance, if Cr assigns a value
of 0 or 1 to some propositions but a value strictly between 0 and 1 to others, then the
antecedent condition is not met. We see little reason not to accept this desideratum,
though for completeness, we later discuss its relaxation too.
It is easy to see that, in simple cases, our four desiderata can be met by a suitable
threshold rule. For example, if the proposition set X contains only a single proposition
p and its negation ¬p, or if it contains many logically independent proposition-negation
pairs, the desiderata are met by any threshold rule that uses a (strict) threshold of t for
p and a (weak) threshold of 1  t for ¬p, where 0  t < 1. As we will see below, things
become more di cult once the proposition set X is more complex.
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4 Judgment Aggregation Formalized
We now move on to the formal definition of a judgment-aggregation problem.18 The
proposition set X remains as defined in the last section and is now interpreted as the set
of propositions on which judgments are to be made. In judgment-aggregation theory,
this set is also called the agenda. Let there be a finite set N = {1, 2, ..., n} of individuals,
with n   2. Each individual i holds a judgment set, labelled Ji, which is defined just like
a belief set in the previous section; the name “judgment set” is purely conventional. So Ji
is a subset of X, which is called consistent, complete, and implication-closed if it has the
respective properties, as defined above. As before, consistency and completeness jointly
imply implication-closure. A combination of judgment sets across the n individuals,
hJ1, ..., Jni, is called a profile. An example of a profile is given by the first three rows of
Table 1 above, where the relevant proposition set X consists of p, q, r, p ^ q ^ r, and
their negations.
A judgment-aggregation rule forX is a function F that maps each profile of individual
judgment sets (within some domain of admissible profiles) to a collective judgment set
J . Like the individual judgment sets, the collective judgment set J is a subset of X.
The best-known example of a judgment-aggregation rule is majority rule: here, for
each profile hJ1, ..., Jni, the collective judgment set consists of all majority-accepted
propositions in X, formally
J = {p 2 X : |{i 2 N : p 2 Ji}| > n
2
}.
As we have seen, a shortcoming of majority rule is that, when the propositions in X are
logically connected, the majority judgments may be inconsistent; recall Table 1.
We now state some desiderata that are often imposed on a judgment-aggregation
rule. They are generalizations of Arrow’s desiderata on a preference-aggregation rule, as
discussed later. The first desideratum says that the judgment-aggregation rule should
accept as input any profile of consistent and complete individual judgment sets.
Universal domain. The domain of F is the set of all profiles of consistent and complete
individual judgment sets on X.
Informally, the aggregation rule should be able to cope with “conditions of pluralism”.
It should not presuppose that there is already a certain amount of agreement between
di↵erent individuals’ judgments.
18We follow the formalism in List and Pettit, “Aggregating Sets of Judgments” (op. cit.) and Dietrich,
“A Generalised Model of Judgment Aggregation” (op. cit.).
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The second desideratum says that the collective judgment set produced by the ag-
gregation rule should always be consistent and complete (again relative to X).
Collective consistency and completeness. For every profile hJ1, ..., Jni in the do-
main of F , the collective judgment set J = F (J1, ..., Jn) is consistent and complete.
The consistency requirement is easy to justify: most real-world collective decision-making
bodies—ranging from expert committees and courts to legislatures and the boards of
organizations—are expected, at a minimum, to avoid inconsistencies in their collective
judgments. Furthermore, in many (though not all) judgment-aggregation problems,
completeness is a reasonable requirement as well, insofar as propositions are put on
the agenda (that is, included in the set X) precisely because they are supposed to be
adjudicated. We also consider relaxations of this requirement below.
The third desideratum says that the collective judgment on any proposition p should
depend only on the individual judgments on p, not on the individual judgments on other
propositions.
Propositionwise independence. For any profiles hJ1, ..., Jni and hJ 01, ..., J 0ni in the
domain of F and any p in X, if p 2 Ji , p 2 J 0i for every individual i in N , then
p 2 J , p 2 J 0, where J = F (J1, ..., Jn) and J 0 = F (J 01, ..., J 0n).
This captures the idea that when we aggregate judgments, we should consider each
proposition independently. Although this requirement is often challenged and we relax
it later, there are at least two familiar arguments in its support. First, propositionwise
independence can be viewed as a requirement of informational parsimony in collective
decision making: if an aggregation rule satisfies it, then we can determine the collective
judgment on any proposition p by considering only the individual judgments on p. There
are no holistic interaction e↵ects, whereby the collective judgment on p may change due
to a change in individual judgments on other propositions, with the individual judgments
on p remaining equal. Such holistic interaction e↵ects would complicate the relationship
between individual and collective judgments and thereby make the aggregation rule
potentially less transparent. Second, an aggregation rule that violates propositionwise
independence is vulnerable to strategic voting: individuals may strategically influence
the collective judgments on some propositions by misrepresenting their judgments on
others. If one cares about non-manipulability, one has a prima facie reason to endorse
independence as a requirement on judgment aggregation.19
19See Franz Dietrich and Christian List, “Strategy-proof Judgment Aggregation,” Economics and
Philosophy, XXIII, 3 (November 2007): 269–300.
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The final desideratum says that if all individuals hold the same individual judgment
set, this judgment set should become the collective one.
Consensus preservation. For any unanimous profile hJ, ..., Ji in the domain of F ,
F (J, ..., J) = J .
Since consensus preservation imposes restrictions only when there is a universal con-
sensus on all propositions on the agenda—not when there is a consensus only on some
propositions without a consensus on others—it is rather undemanding (especially when
the set X is large) and therefore hard to challenge.
As in our discussion of the four baseline desiderata on a belief-binarization rule, it is
important to note that, in simple cases, the present desiderata can easily be met. For
example, if the proposition setX contains only a single proposition p and its negation ¬p,
or if it contains many logically independent proposition-negation pairs, then majority
rule satisfies all four desiderata, as does a suitable super- or sub-majority rule.
5 The Correspondence between Belief Binarization and
Judgment Aggregation
We can now describe the relationship between belief binarization and judgment aggre-
gation with full precision. Let f be a belief-binarization rule for the proposition set
X. We show that, for any group size n, we can use f to construct a corresponding
judgment-aggregation rule F for X. The construction is in two steps.
In the first step, we convert any given profile of consistent and complete individual
judgment sets into the corresponding propositionwise anonymous profile, that is, the
specification of the proportion of individual support for each proposition in X. Formally,
for each profile hJ1, ..., Jni, let CrhJ1,...,Jni be the function from X into [0, 1] that assigns
to each proposition p in X the proportion of individuals accepting it:
CrhJ1,...,Jni(p) =
|{i 2 N : p 2 Ji}|
n
.
Although the function CrhJ1,...,Jni is a “proportion-of-support” function on X, it behaves
formally like a degree-of-belief function and can thus be mathematically treated as such
a function. In particular, it is probabilistically coherent, since each individual judgment
set in hJ1, ..., Jni is consistent and complete.
In the second step, we apply the given belief-binarization rule f to the constructed
proportion function CrhJ1,...,Jni so as to yield a binary belief set, which can then be
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reinterpreted as a collective judgment set. As long as CrhJ1,...,Jni is in the domain of f,
the judgment set J = f(CrhJ1,...,Jni) is well-defined, so that hJ1, ..., Jni is in the domain
of the judgment-aggregation rule that we are constructing.
These two steps yield the judgment-aggregation rule F which assigns to each admis-
sible profile hJ1, ..., Jni the collective judgment set
F (J1, ..., Jn) = f(CrhJ1,...,Jni).
Call this the judgment-aggregation rule induced by the given belief-binarization rule.
Simply put, it aggregates any given profile of individual judgment sets by binarizing the
proportion function which corresponds to that profile.
Proposition 1. The judgment-aggregation rule F induced by a belief-binarization rule
f is anonymous, where anonymity is defined as follows.
Anonymity. F is invariant under permutations (relabellings) of the individuals. For-
mally, for any profiles hJ1, ..., Jni and hJ 01, ..., J 0ni in the domain of F which are permu-
tations of one another, F (J1, ..., Jn) = F (J 01, ..., J 0n).
Proposition 1 is a consequence of the fact that the proportion of individuals ac-
cepting each proposition is not a↵ected by permutations of those individuals. Formally,
we have CrhJ1,...,Jni = CrhJ 01,...,J 0ni whenever the profiles hJ1, ..., Jni and hJ
0
1, ..., J
0
ni are
permutations of one another. Furthermore, the following result holds:
Proposition 2. If the binarization rule f satisfies universal domain, belief consistency
and completeness, propositionwise independence, and certainty preservation, then, for
any group size n, the induced aggregation rule F satisfies universal domain, collective
consistency and completeness, propositionwise independence, and unanimity preserva-
tion.
To show this, we suppose that the binarization rule f satisfies the relevant desiderata,
and we take F to be the induced aggregation rule for a given group size n. Then:
(i) F satisfies universal domain because, for every profile hJ1, ..., Jni of consistent and
complete individual judgment sets, the function CrhJ1,...,Jni is in the domain of f ,
and so F (J1, ..., Jn) = f(CrhJ1,...,Jni) is well-defined.
(ii) F satisfies collective consistency and completeness because, for every profile
hJ1, ..., Jni in its domain, f(CrhJ1,...,Jni) is consistent and complete.
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(iii) F satisfies propositionwise independence because, for any profiles hJ1, ..., Jni and
hJ 01, ..., J 0ni in its domain, if p 2 Ji , p 2 J 0i for every individual i in N , then
CrhJ1,...,Jni(p) = CrhJ 01,...,J 0ni(p), and so p 2 J , p 2 J
0, where J = f(CrhJ1,...,Jni)
and J 0 = f(CrhJ 01,...,J 0ni) (by propositionwise independence of f).
(iv) F satisfies consensus preservation because, for any unanimous profile hJ, ..., Ji in
its domain, CrhJ,...,Ji assigns extremal degrees of belief (0 or 1) to all propositions
in X (namely 1 if p 2 J and 0 if p /2 J), and so we must have f(CrhJ,...,Ji) = J (by
certainty preservation of f).
In sum, the existence of a belief-binarization rule satisfying our baseline desiderata guar-
antees, for every group size n, the existence of an anonymous judgment-aggregation rule
satisfying the corresponding aggregation-theoretic desiderata. In the next section, we
discuss the consequences of this fact.
6 An Impossibility Theorem
As noted, when the proposition set X is su ciently simple, such as X = {p,¬p}, we
can indeed find belief-binarization rules for X that satisfy our four desiderata. Similarly,
for such a set X, we can find judgment-aggregation rules satisfying the corresponding
aggregation-theoretic desiderata. We now show that this situation changes dramatically
when X is more complex. In this section, we state and prove the simplest version of our
impossibility result. To state this result, call a proposition set X a non-trivial algebra if,
in addition to being closed under negation, it is closed under conjunction (equivalently,
under disjunction) and it contains more than one contingent proposition-negation pair
(where a proposition p is contingent if it is neither tautological, nor contradictory).
Theorem 1. For any non-trivial algebra X, there exists no belief-binarization rule
satisfying universal domain, belief consistency and completeness, propositionwise inde-
pendence, and certainty preservation.
To prove this result, suppose, contrary to Theorem 1, there exists a belief-binarization
rule satisfying all four desiderata for some non-trivial algebra X. Call this binarization
rule f . Consider the judgment-aggregation rule F induced by f via the construction
described in the last section, for some group size n   2. By Proposition 1, F satisfies
anonymity. By Proposition 2, since f satisfies the four baseline desiderata on belief bina-
rization, F satisfies the corresponding four aggregation-theoretic desiderata. However,
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the following result is well known to hold (it is a simplified version of the judgment-
aggregation variant of Arrow’s impossibility theorem, as explained below):
Background Result 1. For any non-trivial algebra X, any judgment-aggregation rule
satisfying universal domain, collective consistency and completeness, propositionwise
independence, and consensus preservation is dictatorial : there is some fixed individual i
in N such that, for each profile hJ1, ..., Jni in the domain, F (J1, ..., Jn) = Ji.
So, there could not possibly exist an anonymous (and thereby non-dictatorial) ag-
gregation rule satisfying all four conditions. Hence the belief-binarization rule f on
which the aggregation rule F was based could not satisfy our four desiderata on belief
binarization, contrary to our supposition. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Since subjective probability functions are normally defined on algebras, Theorem 1
shows that our four baseline desiderata are mutually inconsistent when we wish to bina-
rize a full-blown subjective probability function, except in trivial cases. In the Appendix,
we present a more general version of this impossibility result, derived from the fully gen-
eral version of Background Result 1. The more general theorem and background result
are exactly like their simplified counterparts stated here, except that they replace the
assumption that the proposition set X is a non-trivial algebra with the less demanding
assumption that X satisfies a combinatorial property called “strong connectedness”. A
non-trivial algebra is just one instance of a “strongly connected” proposition set. Other
proposition sets, which fall short of being algebras, qualify as “strongly connected” too,
and so the impossibility result applies to them as well.
7 A Sibling of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem
As anticipated, the significance of Background Result 1 lies in the fact that—in its
general form—it is the judgment-aggregation variant of Arrow’s classic impossibility
theorem in social choice theory.20 This, in turn, means that our impossibility theorem
on belief-binarization and Arrow’s theorem are siblings in logical space: they can be
derived from a common parent theorem. To explain this point, it is useful to revisit
Arrow’s original result.21
20See the references in footnote 10. Further details are in the Appendix.
21Our account of the relationship between judgment aggregation and Arrovian preference aggregation
follows Dietrich and List, “Arrow’s Theorem in Judgment Aggregation” (op. cit.). For a precursor, see
Christian List and Philip Pettit, “Aggregating Sets of Judgments: Two Impossibility Results Compared,”
Synthese, CXL, 1–2 (May 2004): 207–35. See also the works cited in footnote 10.
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As already noted, Arrow considered the aggregation of preferences, rather than judg-
ments. Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} be a finite set of individuals, with n   2, each of whom
holds a preference ordering, Pi, over some set K = {x, y, ...} of options. Interpreta-
tionally, the elements of K could be electoral candidates, policy proposals, or states of
a↵airs, and each Pi ranks them in some order of preference (for example, from best to
worst). A combination of preference orderings across the n individuals, hP1, ..., Pni, is
called a profile of preference orderings. We are looking for a preference-aggregation rule,
F , which is a function that maps each profile of individual preference orderings (within
some domain of admissible profiles) to a collective preference ordering P . Arrow imposed
four conditions on a preference-aggregation rule, which were the initial inspiration for
the four baseline requirements on judgment aggregation that we have already discussed.
Universal domain. The domain of F is the set of all profiles of rational individual
preference orderings. (We here call a preference ordering rational if it is a transitive,
irreflexive, and connected binary relation on K; for expositional simplicity, we thus
restrict our attention to indi↵erence-free preference orderings.)
Collective rationality. For every profile hP1, ..., Pni in the domain of F , the collective
preference ordering P = F(P1, ..., Pn) is rational.
Pairwise independence. For any profiles hP1, ..., Pni and hP 01, ..., P 0ni in the domain
of F and any pair of options x and y in K, if Pi and P 0i rank x and y in the same way
for every individual i in N , then P and P 0 also rank x and y in the same way, where
P = F(P1, ..., Pn) and P 0 = F(P 01, ..., P 0n).
The Pareto principle. For any profile hP1, ..., Pni in the domain of F and any pair
of options x and y in K, if Pi ranks x above y for every individual i in N , then P also
ranks x above y, where P = F(P1, ..., Pn).
Arrow’s original theorem now asserts the following:
Arrow’s theorem. For any set K of three or more options, any preference-aggregation
rule satisfying universal domain, collective rationality, pairwise independence, and the
Pareto principle is dictatorial : there is some fixed individual i in N such that, for each
profile hP1, ..., Pni in the domain, F(P1, ..., Pn) = Pi.22
To confirm that Background Result 1 (in its fully general form) is indeed a gener-
alization of Arrow’s theorem, we note that the latter can be derived from the former.
22Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (op. cit.).
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The key observation is that, setting aside interpretational di↵erences, we can represent
any preference-aggregation problem formally as a special kind of judgment-aggregation
problem. The representation is surprisingly simple. Let the set X of propositions on
which judgments are made—the agenda—consist of all pairwise ranking propositions of
the form “x is preferable to y”, abbreviated xPy, where x and y are options in K and
P represents pairwise preference. Formally,
X = {xPy : x, y 2 K with x 6= y}.
Call this proposition set the preference agenda for K. Under the simplifying assumption
of irreflexive preferences, we can interpret yPx as the negation of xPy, and so the setX is
negation-closed. We call any subset Y of X consistent if Y is a consistent set of binary
ranking propositions relative to the rationality constraints on preferences introduced
above (transitivity etc.).23 For example, the set Y = {xPy, yPz, xPz} is consistent,
while the set Y = {xPy, yPz, zPx} is not, as it involves a breach of transitivity.
Since any preference ordering P over K is just a binary relation, it can be uniquely
represented by a subset of X, namely the subset consisting of all pairwise ranking propo-
sitions validated by P . In this way, rational preference orderings over K stand in a
one-to-one correspondence with consistent and complete judgment sets for the prefer-
ence agenda X. Further, preference-aggregation rules (for preferences over K) stand
in a one-to-one correspondence with judgment-aggregation rules (for judgments on the
associated preference agenda X). Now, applied to X, the judgment-aggregation desider-
ata of universal domain, collective consistency and completeness, and propositionwise
independence reduce to Arrow’s original desiderata of universal domain, collective ratio-
nality, and pairwise independence. Consensus preservation reduces to a weaker version
of Arrow’s Pareto principle, which says that if all individuals hold the same preference
ordering over all options, this preference ordering should become the collective one.24
Of course, the proposition set X that we have just constructed is not an algebra: it
is not closed under conjunction or disjunction. However, when K contains more than
two options, X can be shown to be “strongly connected”, in the sense explained in
the Appendix, and so Background Result 1 in its general form can be applied, yielding
Arrow’s original theorem as a corollary.
Corollary of the judgment-aggregation variant of Arrow’s theorem. For any
23Technically, Y is consistent if and only if there exists at least one rational (here: transitive, irreflexive,
and connected) preference ordering over K that validates all the binary ranking propositions in Y .
24This desideratum is implied by Arrow’s Pareto principle (given collective rationality), but does not
generally imply it. The converse implication holds under universal domain and pairwise independence.
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preference agenda X defined for a set K of three or more options, any judgment-
aggregation rule satisfying universal domain, collective consistency and completeness,
propositionwise independence, and consensus preservation is dictatorial.
Figure 1 displays the logical relationships between (i) the judgment-aggregation vari-
ant of Arrow’s theorem, (ii) Arrow’s original theorem, and (iii) our baseline impossibility
theorem on belief binarization. In short, Arrow’s theorem and our result on belief bi-
narization, which are at first sight very di↵erent from one another, can both be derived
from the same common impossibility theorem on judgment aggregation.
Figure 1: The common source of two distinct impossibility results
8 Escape Routes from the Impossibility
If we wish to avoid the impossibility of belief binarization, we must relax at least one of
the baseline desiderata we have introduced. We suggest the following tentative order of
how plausible the desiderata are. (In this list, we split the consistency-and-completeness
desideratum into its components.)
(1) Certainty preservation is very plausible as well as extremely undemanding: it
only ever applies when the entire degree-of-belief function is already binary, meaning that
it assigns no values other than 0 or 1 to any propositions. Not preserving an agent’s
beliefs in this special case would be hard to defend.
(2) Universal domain seems non-negotiable if our aim is to find a universally appli-
cable belief-binarization rule. That said, it is common to study judgment aggregation
in the context of certain domain restrictions, for instance by assuming that the amount
of pluralism in individual judgments is limited. Analogously, one might ask whether we
can find plausible belief-binarization rules if we restrict the admissible degree-of-belief
functions. This suggests the theoretical possibility of relaxing universal domain.
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(3) The consistency requirement on beliefs—part of the consistency-and-completeness
desideratum—is also very plausible and familiar. Nonetheless, if full consistency is too
di cult to achieve, one might opt for a less idealistic requirement, which demands only
the avoidance of “blatantly inconsistent” beliefs, as discussed below. Perhaps real people
do not have fully consistent beliefs and only manage to avoid “blatant” inconsistencies.
(4) Implication-closure, which is a consequence of the consistency-and-completeness
desideratum, is another standard requirement on beliefs. The idea that beliefs should be
implication-closed is responsible for the intuitive force of the lottery paradox. Implication-
closure seems plausible when implication relations between propositions are transpar-
ent, for instance when the proposition set X is not very complex. However, when X is
large and complex, requiring implication-closure is tantamount to requiring logical om-
niscience, which is no longer realistic, and thus relaxing it may sometimes be warranted.
(5) Propositionwise independence is arguably a stronger candidate for relaxation. As
noted, it rules out a holistic relationship between degrees of belief and binary beliefs, by
requiring the binary belief concerning each proposition to depend only on the degree of
belief in that proposition, not on the degrees of belief in others. Since propositions form
an interconnected web, however, some propositions are relevant to others, for instance
by standing in premise–conclusion relations. So, we may plausibly let the belief on a
proposition depend on the degrees of belief in all propositions relevant to it. Further-
more, the case against relaxing propositionwise independence is weaker in the context
of belief binarization than in the context of judgment aggregation, where aggregation
rules violating independence are vulnerable to strategic voting. There is presumably
no such strategic vulnerability in belief binarization. Even in the context of judgment
aggregation, the fact that some propositions are relevant to others is often seen as a
reason to give up propositionwise independence. In light of our impossibility result, we
may well conclude that an agent’s binary belief on each proposition cannot be a function
of his or her degree of belief in that proposition alone.
(6) Finally, completeness of beliefs—another part of the consistency-and-completeness
desideratum—is the most natural candidate for relaxation. As noted, we introduced this
requirement mainly for analytic purposes, and unlike in judgment aggregation, where
a definitive adjudication of every agenda item is often needed, completeness is not a
general requirement on binary beliefs.
In what follows, we discuss the escape routes from our impossibility result that open
up if we relax these desiderata. We consider them in the reverse order of the list just
given, beginning with the desiderata that seem most natural to give up.25
25For simplicity, we assume that the proposition set X is finite in Sections 8.2 to 8.5.
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8.1 Relaxing completeness of beliefs
As noted, the initially most obvious response to our impossibility result is to argue that
the completeness requirement on beliefs is too strong. There is nothing irrational about
suspending belief on some proposition-negation pairs: neither believing the proposition,
nor believing its negation. This suggests relaxing completeness, while retaining the
familiar requirement that beliefs should be consistent and closed under logical implication
(within the set X):
Belief consistency and implication-closure. For every Cr in the domain of f , the
belief set B = f(Cr) is consistent and implication-closed (relative to X).
This permits suspending belief on some proposition-negation pairs in X. (Indeed,
even an empty belief set is consistent and implication-closed, assuming X contains no
tautology.) Surprisingly, however, the use of this weaker desideratum does not get us
very far if we insist on the other desiderata. Only a single, extremely conservative
binarization rule becomes possible, namely a uniform threshold rule with threshold 1
for all propositions. This can be viewed as a triviality result, along the lines of other
triviality results in the literature.26
Theorem 2. For any non-trivial algebra X (more generally, any “strongly connected”
proposition set), any belief-binarization rule satisfying universal domain, belief consis-
tency and implication-closure, propositionwise independence, and certainty preservation
is a threshold rule with a uniform threshold of 1 for the acceptance of any proposition,
that is, for any degree-of-belief function Cr in the domain, f(Cr) = {p 2 X : Cr(p) =
1}.27
This result, too, is a consequence of a result on judgment aggregation, though the
proof is a bit longer than that of Theorem 1. Consider a proposition set X with the
specified properties, and suppose f is a belief-binarization rule satisfying the desider-
ata listed in Theorem 2. As before, for any group size n, f induces an anonymous
judgment-aggregation rule F . By the analogue of Proposition 2, F satisfies universal
domain, collective consistency and implication-closure, propositionwise independence,
and consensus preservation. The following result holds:
26See, for example, Douven and Williamson, “Generalizing the Lottery Paradox” (op. cit.).
27Unlike Douven and Williamson’s result (ibid.), our result applies not only to algebras, but to all
“strongly connected” proposition sets, and it does not presuppose that the su cient condition for belief
acceptance is what Douven and Williamson call “structural”; rather, our desideratum of propositionwise
independence allows, in principle, the use of di↵erent acceptance criteria for di↵erent propositions.
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Background Result 2. For any “strongly connected” proposition setX, any judgment-
aggregation rule satisfying universal domain, collective consistency and implication-
closure, propositionwise independence, and consensus preservation is oligarchic: there is
some fixed non-empty set M of individuals in N such that, for each profile hJ1, ..., Jni
in the domain, F (J1, ..., Jn) = \
i2M
Ji.28
The set M of “oligarchs” could be any non-empty subset of N , ranging from a singleton
set, where M = {i} for some individual i, to the set of all individuals, where M = N .
In the first case, the aggregation rule is dictatorial; in the last, it is the unanimity
rule. Since any aggregation rule induced by a belief-binarization rule is anonymous,
and an anonymous aggregation rule can be oligarchic only if it is the unanimity rule,
Background Result 2 immediately implies that the induced rule F is the unanimity rule.
So, no proposition is collectively accepted under F with less than 100% support.
Could the belief-binarization rule f on which F is based still di↵er from a threshold
rule with threshold 1? A slightly more technical argument shows that if f were distinct
from such a rule, this would contradict what we have just learnt from Background
Result 2.29 And so f must be a threshold rule with a uniform threshold of 1 for the
acceptance of any proposition, as stated by Theorem 2. The bottom line is that relaxing
the requirement of completeness of beliefs alone, while retaining all other desiderata,
does not open up a very strong escape route from our impossibility result.
8.2 Relaxing propositionwise independence
A more promising escape route from the impossibility involves giving up the requirement
that the binary belief on any proposition p depend exclusively on the degree of belief
28Franz Dietrich and Christian List, “Judgment Aggregation without Full Rationality,” Social Choice
and Welfare, XXXI, 1 (June 2008): 15–39; and Elad Dokow and Ron Holzman, “Aggregation of Binary
Evaluations with Abstentions,” Journal of Economic Theory, CXLV, 2 (March 2010): 544–61.
29Suppose f is not a threshold rule with threshold 1. Then there must exist a proposition q in
X and a degree-of-belief function Cr with Cr(q) < 1 such that q 2 B, where B = f(Cr). (Here
q must be contingent: if q were tautological, we could not have Cr(q) < 1; if it were contradictory,
we could not have q 2 B, given B’s consistency.) In the Appendix, we show that, under the present
conditions, f must be monotonic: if q 2 f(Cr), then q 2 f(Cr0) for any other credence function Cr0 with
Cr0(q) > Cr(q). Consider what this implies for any induced aggregation rule F . Pick two consistent and
complete judgment sets J, J 0 ✓ X such that q 2 J and q /2 J 0, and construct a profile hJ1, ..., Jni (for a
su ciently large n) such that a proportion of more than Cr(q) of the individuals in N , but fewer than
all, have the judgment set J and the rest have the judgment set J 0. By the construction of F , we have
F (J1, ..., Jn) = f(CrhJ1,...,Jni), where for each proposition p in X, CrhJ1,...,Jni(p) =
|{i2N :p2Ji}|
n . Since
CrhJ1,...,Jni(q) > Cr(q) and f is monotonic, we must have q 2 f(CrhJ1,...,Jni) and hence q 2 F (J1, ..., Jn),
despite the lack of unanimous support for q. This contradicts the fact that F is the unanimity rule.
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in p, not on the degrees of belief in other propositions. Instead, we may admit a more
“holistic” dependence of beliefs on degrees of belief, by taking an agent’s belief on p to
be a function of his or her degrees of belief across several propositions—in the limit,
an entire “web” of propositions. The “units of binarization” will then no longer be
individual propositions in isolation, but suitable sets of propositions.
How might one argue for such a more holistic approach to belief binarization? One
natural thought is that beliefs in the all-or-nothing sense pick out “salient peaks” in
the “credence landscape”, such as propositions to which the agent assigns high credence
compared to their salient alternatives.30 Relatedly, it is plausible to suggest that the
binary belief concerning any proposition p should be formed upon considering the degrees
of belief in all those propositions that are relevant to it.
To formalize these ideas, it is helpful to introduce the notion of a relevance relation
between propositions.31 Formally, this is a binary relation R on the proposition set X,
where qRp is interpreted to mean that q is “relevant” to p. For any proposition p in the
set X, we write R(p) to denote the set of all propositions q in X that are relevant to p,
formally
R(p) = {q 2 X : qRp}.
The key idea, now, is that the binary belief on p may depend on the degrees of belief in
all propositions that are relevant to p. This suggests the following desideratum:
Independence of irrelevant propositions. For any Cr and Cr0 in the domain of
f and any p in X, if Cr(q) = Cr0(q) for all q 2 R(p), then p 2 B , p 2 B0, where
B = f(Cr) and B0 = f(Cr0).
We think this desideratum is hard to contest, provided we have specified the relevance
relation R adequately. Indeed, the demandingness of the present desideratum depends
entirely on the specification of R. The smaller the set R(p) of relevant propositions
for each proposition p, the more restrictive the desideratum becomes. By contrast, the
larger the set R(p) for each p, the more permissive it is.
Replacing propositionwise independence with independence of irrelevant propositions
makes explicit the need to specify which propositions are relevant to which others, so
that the binary beliefs on the latter may depend on the degrees of belief in the former.
This move also makes clear how restrictive the original independence desideratum is. It
30We are indebted to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this point.
31This is another import from judgment-aggregation theory. See Franz Dietrich, “Aggregation Theory
and the Relevance of Some Issues to Others,” Journal of Economic Theory, CLX (December 2015):
463–493.
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seems justified only if no two distinct propositions are ever relevant to one another—a
very restrictive assumption. Formally, propositionwise independence is the special case
of independence of irrelevant propositions where R(p) = {p} for all p in X.
As we will now see, for plausible specifications of the relevance relation R, we can
avoid our impossibility result and find possible binarization rules. Again, they have
counterparts in judgment-aggregation theory. We here give the most salient examples.
Premise-based rules. A premise-based rule exploits the fact that there may be cer-
tain premise–conclusion relationships between propositions. Specifically, we designate a
subset Y of X as a set of “premises” (taking Y to be closed under negation), and assume
that the premises are relevant to all other propositions, while those other propositions
are not relevant to the premises. Formally, we assume that R(p) = Y for each p outside
Y while R(p) = {p} for each p in Y . We now (i) form the binary beliefs on all premises
by means of a suitable propositionwise independent binarization rule such as a thresh-
old rule, and (ii) derive the binary beliefs on all other propositions by logical inference.
Formally, for every degree-of-belief function Cr in the domain, we have
f(Cr) = {p 2 X : g(Cr|Y ) entails p},
where Y is the set of premises, g is the binarization rule (for Y ) used to determine
the beliefs for those premises, and Cr|Y is the restriction of the degree-of-belief func-
tion Cr to the premise set Y .32 As long as the set Y and the rule g are chosen so
as to guarantee a consistent set g(Cr|Y ) (for example, by making sure that the di↵er-
ent proposition-negation pairs in Y are logically independent from one another), the
premise-based rule will always yield consistent and implication-closed belief sets. Fur-
thermore, given the way the relevance relation R has been specified, the rule satisfies
independence of irrelevant propositions. Premise-based rules have been studied exten-
sively in judgment-aggregation theory.33 In premise-based aggregation, a group makes
32For any admissible degree-of-belief function Cr, Cr|Y is the function from Y into the interval from
0 to 1 such that Cr|Y (p) = Cr(p) for each p in Y . Now g is a (propositionwise independent) function
that assigns to each such restricted degree-of-belief function Cr|Y a belief set B ✓ Y for the premises.
33Relevant works include Kornhauser and Sager, “Unpacking the court” (op. cit.); Lewis A. Korn-
hauser, “Modeling collegial courts. II. Legal doctrine,” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization,
VIII, 3 (October 1992): 441–70; Pettit, “Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma” (op cit.);
List and Pettit, “Aggregating Sets of Judgments” (op. cit.); Bruce Chapman, “Rational Aggregation,”
Politics, Philosophy and Economics, I, 3 (October 2002): 337–54; Luc Bovens and Wlodek Rabinowicz,
“Democratic Answers to Complex Questions—An Epistemic Perspective,” Synthese, CL, 1 (May 2006):
131–53; Christian List, “The Discursive Dilemma and Public Reason,” Ethics, CXVI, 2 (January 2006):
362–402; and Franz Dietrich, “Judgment Aggregation: (Im)Possibility Theorems,” Journal of Economic
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its collective judgments by taking majority votes only on some logically independent
premises (for example, “Did the defendant do a particular action?”, “Was he or she
contractually obliged not to do that action?”) and deriving its judgments on all other
propositions by logical inference (for example, “Is the defendant liable for breach of
contract?”). The downside of a premise-based aggregation rule is that a proposition
can end up being collectively accepted by logical inference even if only a minority, or in
the extreme case none, of the individuals accept it. Similarly, in premise-based belief
binarization, a proposition could be included in the belief set despite the assignment of
a very low, or even zero, degree of belief to it. In Table 2 above, taking p, q, and r to
be the premises and applying an acceptance threshold of 2/3 to them would lead to the
acceptance of p, q, r, and p ^ q ^ r, despite the assignment of a zero degree of belief to
p ^ q ^ r. To be sure, the output of a premise-based rule depends on what the specified
set of premises is. Premise-based belief binarization, like premise-based aggregation, is
plausible to the extent that we have a non-arbitrary way of selecting the premises and
are prepared to generate our overall beliefs or judgments on the basis of considering
those premises alone.
Sequential priority rules. Sequential priority rules are generalizations of premise-
based rules. Here, we specify some order of priority among the propositions in X,
representable by a relevance relation R that constitutes a linear order on X (a complete,
transitive, and anti-symmetric binary relation). For each degree-of-belief function Cr,
we then construct the belief set B = f(Cr) as follows. The propositions in X are con-
sidered in the given order of priority, and the belief set B is built up sequentially. For
each proposition under consideration, say p, we begin by asking whether p is entailed by
propositions that we have included in B in earlier steps. If the answer is yes, we embrace
this entailment and include p in B. If the answer is no, we apply some propositionwise
binarization criterion to Cr(p), such as a suitable threshold, and include p in B if and
only if that binarization criterion recommends the acceptance of p and this acceptance
does not yield an inconsistent belief set. By construction, the resulting belief set is
always consistent. Furthermore, the belief on each proposition p depends only on the
degrees of belief in propositions that are ahead of p in the given order of priority (includ-
ing p itself), which are precisely the propositions that are deemed relevant to p. So, the
present binarization rule satisfies independence of irrelevant propositions. Whether the
rule also generates implication-closed beliefs depends on the propositionwise binarization
Theory, CXXVI, 1 (January 2006): 286–98. For more recent generalizations, see Franz Dietrich and
Philippe Mongin, “The premise-based approach to judgment aggregation,” Journal of Economic The-
ory, CXLV, 2 (March 2010): 562–82.
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criterion and the order of priority. The downside of a sequential priority rule, like that
of a premise-based rule, is that it sometimes mandates the inclusion of a proposition in
the belief set B even when the agent’s degree of belief in it is very low or zero. This
can happen when that proposition is entailed by other accepted propositions. Sequential
priority rules for belief binarization are analogous to sequential priority rules for judg-
ment aggregation.34 The only di↵erence lies in the use of a propositionwise binarization
criterion (such as a propositionwise threshold) instead of a propositionwise aggregation
criterion (such as propositionwise majority voting). In both belief binarization and judg-
ment aggregation, sequential priority rules may be path-dependent : their output is not
generally invariant under changes of the order of priority among the propositions. This
means that the defensibility of such a rule depends, in part, on our ability to specify that
order non-arbitrarily. However, if we take the desideratum of independence of irrelevant
propositions seriously, then we should accept that di↵erent specifications of the relevance
relation may give rise to di↵erent binary beliefs.
Generalized priority rules. Sequential priority rules can be further generalized by
replacing a linear priority order with a more general priority graph, formally represented
by an acyclic but not necessarily complete relevance relation R.35 For example, consider
the proposition set X consisting of p, p! q, q, q ! r, r, and their negations.36 Here the
priority graph might deem (i) r relevant to itself, (ii) each of q and q ! r relevant to r
and to itself, and (iii) each of p and p! q relevant to q and r and to itself, as illustrated
in Figure 2. (In that figure, one proposition is relevant to another whenever there exists
a directed path along the dotted arrows from the first proposition to the second.) The
Figure 2: A priority graph
34On sequential priority rules for judgment aggregation, see Christian List, “A Model of Path-
Dependence in Decisions over Multiple Propositions,” American Political Science Review, XCVIII, 3
(August 2014): 495–513, and Franz Dietrich and Christian List, “Judgment Aggregation by Quota
Rules: Majority Voting Generalized,” Journal of Theoretical Politics, XIX, 4 (October 2007): 391–424.
35By “acyclicity”, we here mean that there is no priority cycle in which p1Rp2, p2Rp3, ..., pk 1Rpk,
and pkRp1, where p1, p2, ..., pk all belong to distinct proposition-negation pairs {pj ,¬pj}.
36There are a number of possible ways of interpreting the implication arrow ! in the present context.
The easiest is to define p! q as ¬p _ q.
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overall belief set is then defined recursively, beginning with the propositions at the “top”
of the graph (those to which no other propositions are relevant), where a propositionwise
binarization criterion is applied, such as a propositionwise credence threshold. The belief
on any “non-top” proposition (that is, one to which some other propositions are relevant)
is formed either by logical entailment from beliefs on propositions that are “prior” to it
in the graph or—if the beliefs on those “prior” propositions leave the given proposition
unconstrained—by applying a propositionwise binarization criterion. One can show that
a generalized priority rule yields consistent beliefs, while satisfying independence of irrel-
evant propositions, provided the priority graph is “well-behaved”. Well-behavedness, in
turn, means that R is transitive (that is, if pRq and qRr, then pRr), negation-invariant
(that is, if pRq then also ¬pRq and pR¬q), and there are never any logical interdepen-
dencies between the “relevance ancestors” of pairwise mutually irrelevant propositions
(where a proposition’s “relevance ancestors” are all those propositions that are relevant
to it).37
Distance-based rules. We have already encountered three classes of non-
propositionwise-independent judgment-aggregation rules that have direct analogues for
belief binarization: premise-based, sequential priority, and generalized priority rules. A
fourth class consists of the distance-based rules. Their application to belief binarization
was first investigated and defended by Jake Chandler.38 Let us begin by defining a
distance-based aggregation rule. To do so, we need to introduce a distance metric over
judgment sets, which specifies how “distant” any two judgment sets are from one another.
Formally, a distance metric assigns to each pair of judgment sets a non-negative number,
interpreted as the distance between them. For each profile of individual judgment sets,
we then select a collective judgment set that minimizes the sum of the distances from
the individual judgment sets, according to that distance metric. Some distance-based
aggregation rules require more information than what is contained in a propositionwise
anonymous profile, and hence have no counterpart in the case of belief binarization,
but others naturally carry over to belief binarization. The best-known distance-based
aggregation rule is the Hamming rule.39 Here the distance between any two judgment
sets is given by the number of propositions in X on which the two judgment sets dis-
37This is the binarization analogue of Theorem 1 in Dietrich, “Aggregation Theory and the Relevance
of Some Issues to Others” (op. cit.), a result concerning general priority rules in judgment aggregation,
here stated informally.
38See Chandler, “Acceptance, Aggregation and Scoring Rules” (op. cit.).
39See, for example, Se´bastien Konieczny and Ramo´n Pino Pe´rez, “Merging Information Under Con-
straints: A Logical Framework,” Journal of Logic and Computation XII, 5 (October 2002): 773–808;
and Pigozzi, “Belief Merging and the Discursive Dilemma” (op. cit.).
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agree (which means the proposition in question is contained in one set but not in the
other). For each profile of individual judgment sets hJ1, ..., Jni, we select a consistent
and complete (or perhaps consistent and implication-closed) collective judgment set J
which minimizes X
i2N
|{p 2 X : p 2 J 6, p 2 Ji}|.
Such a judgment set need not be unique; so we must either define the Hamming rule as
a multi-function (under which more than one collective judgment set can be assigned to
any given profile of individual judgment sets), or introduce a tie-breaking criterion. The
details need not concern us here. Note that minimizing the total Hamming distance is
equivalent to minimizing X
p2X
|{i 2 N : p 2 J 6, p 2 Ji}|.
This, in turn, is equivalent to minimizingX
p2X
|J(p)  CrhJ1,...,Jni(p)|,
where, for each p in X,
J(p) =
(
1 if p 2 J
0 if p /2 J
and CrhJ1,...,Jni is the function that assigns to each proposition p in X the proportion
of individuals accepting p within the given profile hJ1, ..., Jni, as defined earlier. This
suggests the following definition of a Hamming rule for belief binarization: for each
degree-of-belief function Cr, let f(Cr) be a consistent and complete (or alternatively,
consistent and implication-closed) belief set B which minimizesX
p2X
|B(p)  Cr(p)|,
where B(p) is defined in exact analogy to J(p). Informally speaking, the Hamming rule
binarizes any given degree-of-belief function by selecting a belief set that is “minimally
distant” from it, subject to the constraints of consistency and completeness (or alterna-
tively, consistency and implication-closure).40 The Hamming rule is more “holistic” than
the premise-based and priority rules discussed earlier. Unlike those rules, the Hamming
rule assumes, in e↵ect, that all propositions are relevant to one another; the relevance
40As in judgment aggregation, we must either define the Hamming rule as a multi-function, since there
may be more than one distance-minimizing belief set, or introduce some tie-breaking criterion.
29
relationR with respect to which the Hamming rule is guaranteed to satisfy independence
of irrelevant propositions is the total relation, under which R(p) = X for all p in X.
Other non-independent binarization rules. The relationship between anonymous
judgment-aggregation rules and belief-binarization rules can be used not only to derive
binarization rules from aggregation rules but also to derive aggregation rules from bina-
rization rules that have been proposed in the literature. In this way, some insights from
belief-binarization theory carry over to judgment-aggregation theory.41 Given space
constraints, we here discuss only one class of rules for which this reverse translation
is possible: Hannes Leitgeb’s P-stability-based rules.42 Leitgeb o↵ers a method of con-
structing, for each degree-of-belief function Cr (defined on some algebra of propositions),
a specific acceptance threshold such that the set of all propositions for which the agent’s
degree of belief exceeds the threshold is consistent and implication-closed. Crucially, the
threshold may di↵er for di↵erent degree-of-belief functions. The key idea is to identify a
so-called P-stable proposition; this is a proposition p for which Cr(p|q) exceeds 12 for any
proposition q consistent with p. The agent then accepts all those propositions in which
he or she has a degree of belief greater than or equal to t = Cr(p), where p is the iden-
tified P -stable proposition. If we assign to each degree-of-belief function the belief set
generated through this process, we obtain a well-defined belief-binarization rule. Since
the acceptance threshold may di↵er for di↵erent degree-of-belief functions, the present
binarization rule does not satisfy propositionwise independence and thus gives rise to a
holistic relationship between degrees of belief and binary beliefs. Leitgeb acknowledges
that one feature of his proposal is “a strong form of sensitivity of belief to context” and
defends this holism.43 In the present terms, independence of irrelevant propositions is
generally satisfied only with respect to the total relation (as in the case of the Hamming
rule discussed above). Using the construction presented in Section 5, we can use Leit-
geb’s belief-binarization rule to define a corresponding anonymous judgment-aggregation
rule.44 It inherits its interest-value from the arguments that Leitgeb has o↵ered in sup-
port of the underlying belief-binarization rule. A similar translation is possible for Hanti
Lin and Kevin Kelly’s camera-shutter rules for belief binarization.45 These, too, are non-
41Recall Levi, “List and Pettit” (op. cit.).
42Leitgeb, “The Stability Theory of Belief” (op. cit.).
43Leitgeb, “The Stability Theory of Belief” (op. cit.), at p. 168.
44For a recent independent discussion of this idea, see Fabrizio Cariani, “Local Supermajorities,”
Erkenntnis, LXXXI, 2 (April 2016): 391–406.
45See Lin and Kelly, “Propositional Reasoning that Tracks Probabilistic Reasoning” (op. cit.) and
“A Geo-logical Solution to the Lottery Paradox” (op. cit.). For judgment-aggregation applications, see
Kelly and Lin, “Judgment aggregation: A geometrical impossibility proof” (op. cit.).
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independent rules that could be used to generate corresponding judgment-aggregation
rules.
8.3 Relaxing implication-closure of beliefs
A third escape route from our impossibility result is to relax not only the completeness
requirement on beliefs—as already discussed—but also the requirement of implication-
closure. As noted, this requirement might be challenged for large and complex sets of
propositions, where implication-closure amounts to a requirement of logical omniscience.
Instead, we might require only the consistency of beliefs and perhaps their closure under
implication by singletons.46 Call a belief set B closed under implication by singletons
(relative to X) if it contains every proposition p in X for which there is some proposition
q in B that entails p.47
Belief consistency (and closure under implication by singletons). For every Cr
in the domain of f , the belief set B = f(Cr) is consistent (and, if we add the closure
requirement, closed under implication by singletons).
Replacing implication-closure with this weaker requirement opens up some non-trivial
possibilities of belief-binarization, even in the presence of the other desiderata. We need
one preliminary definition. Call a set of propositions minimally inconsistent if it is
inconsistent but all its proper subsets are consistent. The following result holds:
Theorem 3. Let k be the size of the largest minimally inconsistent subset of the
proposition set X. Any threshold rule with a strict threshold of k 1k (or higher) for each
proposition satisfies universal domain, belief consistency (and closure under implication
by singletons), propositionwise independence, and certainty preservation.48
It is worth explaining the significance of k, the size of the largest minimally incon-
sistent subset of X. This parameter can be interpreted as a simple measure of the
interconnectedness between propositions in X. If X contains only one or several uncon-
nected proposition-negation pairs, then the largest minimally inconsistent subsets of X
46Compare Kyburg, Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief (op. cit.).
47In other words, for any p and q in X, if q is in B and q entails p, then p is also in B.
48The highest admissible threshold in this theorem is a weak threshold of 1 (under which the acceptance
criterion for any proposition is a degree of belief of 1). A version of this result has been independently
proved by Kenny Easwaran and Branden Fitelson in “Accuracy, Coherence and Evidence,” in Tamar
Szabo´ Gendler and John Hawthorne, eds., Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2015), pp. 61–96.
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are of the form {p,¬p}, so k is 2.49 If X contains only p, q, p ^ q, and their negations,
then the largest minimally inconsistent subset is {p, q,¬(p^ q)}, so k is 3. If X contains
only p, q, r, p ^ q ^ r, and their negations, as in our example in Section 2, then the
largest minimally inconsistent subset is {p, q, r,¬(p ^ q ^ r)}, so k is 4. In consequence,
the binarization threshold k 1k required in Theorem 3 increases with the complexity of
these cases, from 12 to
2
3 to
3
4 .
50
To prove Theorem 3, let f be a threshold rule with a strict threshold of k 1k (or higher)
for each proposition. It is easy to see that f satisfies universal domain, proposition-
wise independence, certainty preservation, and closure under implication by singletons.51
Suppose, for a contradiction, that B = f(Cr) is inconsistent for some degree-of-belief
function Cr in the domain. Then B must have at least one minimally inconsistent subset
Y , whose size, in turn, is at most k. For any proposition p in Y to be accepted by f ,
we must have Cr(p) > k 1k . Since Cr is probabilistically coherent, it is extendable to
a probability function Pr on the algebra generated by X. This algebra contains the
conjunction of all propositions in Y . Since Y is an inconsistent set, this conjunction is a
contradiction and must be assigned probability 0 by Pr. But we now show that this con-
tradicts the fact that Pr(p) > k 1k for every p in Y (which holds because Pr(p) = Cr(p)
for any p in X, as Pr is an extension of Cr). First note that the probability of the con-
junction of any two propositions—no matter how negatively correlated—must exceed 0
when each proposition has a probability greater than 12 . Similarly, the probability of the
conjunction of any three propositions must exceed 0 when each has a probability greater
than 23 . Generally, the probability of the conjunction of any k propositions that each
have a probability greater than k 1k must exceed 0, a contradiction. This completes the
proof.
Again, this result has a counterpart in judgment-aggregation theory. To state it, we
require one definition. A qualified majority rule is a judgment-aggregation rule which
assigns, to each profile hJ1, ..., Jni, the collective judgment set
J = {p 2 X : |{i 2 N : p 2 Ji}| exceeds qn},
where “exceeds” can be read either strictly (as “>”) or weakly (as “ ”), and q is some
acceptance threshold between 12 and 1. It is a supermajority rule when the acceptance
49This assumes that some proposition p in X is contingent. If X contains no contingent propositions,
then the largest minimally inconsistent subset of X is the singleton set consisting of the contradiction.
50Formulas similar to k 1k have been used by Hawthorne and Bovens, in “The Preface, the Lottery, and
the Logic of Belief” (op. cit.), though without explicitly invoking the notion of minimally inconsistent
sets of propositions.
51The latter excludes a strict threshold of 1 for any non-contradictory proposition, but permits a weak
threshold of 1.
32
threshold requires more than a simple majority of the individuals (“50%+1”). The
following result holds:
Background Result 3. Let k be the size of the largest minimally inconsistent sub-
set of the proposition set X. Any qualified majority rule with a strict threshold of
k 1
k (or higher) for each proposition satisfies universal domain, collective consistency,
propositionwise independence, and unanimity preservation.52
It should be evident that the qualified majority rule in Background Result 3 is simply
the judgment-aggregation rule induced by the binarization rule in Theorem 3.
8.4 Relaxing consistency of beliefs
A fourth response to our impossibility result is to argue that beliefs need not be con-
sistent. Of course, if outright inconsistency of beliefs is permitted, the impossibility
we have identified goes away immediately. Even a binarization rule as simple as the
one that employs the “more-likely-than-not” criterion for belief will then be feasible.
But since inconsistent beliefs violate standard requirements of rationality, one might
wonder whether the present response is a non-starter. However, there is a notion of
less-than-fully-consistent belief which captures the idea that some inconsistencies are
less “blatant” than others, so that we might reasonably opt for a belief-binarization rule
that avoids “blatant” inconsistencies despite not securing full consistency. Indeed, typ-
ical human beings are unlikely to hold fully consistent beliefs, and so the avoidance of
blatant inconsistencies may be viewed as a plausible requirement of bounded rationality.
To introduce the relevant notion of less-than-full consistency, we begin with a few
intuitive observations.53 If someone believes a proposition that is self-contradictory, such
as p^¬p, he or she is rather blatantly inconsistent. If someone believes two propositions,
neither of which is self-contradictory, but which are jointly inconsistent, such as p and
¬p, he or she is still fairly inconsistent, but less so than in the previous case. If someone
believes three jointly inconsistent propositions, any two of which are mutually consistent,
such as p, p ! q, and ¬q, his or her belief set is still relatively inconsistent, but not as
much as in the two previous cases. If someone’s belief set contains ten jointly inconsistent
52Dietrich and List, “Judgment Aggregation by Quota Rules” (op. cit.). The highest admissible
threshold in this theorem is a weak threshold of 1 (under which the acceptance criterion for any propo-
sition is unanimous support).
53The notion to be introduced, k-consistency, was proposed in Christian List, “When to Defer to
Supermajority Testimony—and When Not,” in Jennifer Lackey, ed., Essays in Collective Epistemology
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 240–249.
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propositions, any nine of which are mutually consistent, this is nowhere near as bad as
the previous inconsistencies. As the well-known “preface paradox” brings out, if the
inconsistency is spread out over a very large number of propositions, we may hardly
regard it as bad at all.54 Now the key idea is to interpret the size of the smallest
inconsistent set of believed propositions as a measure of the agent’s inconsistency.
Formally, let us say that a belief set B is k-inconsistent if it has an inconsistent
subset of size less than or equal to k. In our examples, a belief set that includes the
proposition p^¬p is 1-inconsistent; a belief set that includes the propositions p and ¬p is
2-inconsistent, and so on. Similarly, we say that a belief set B is k-consistent if it is free
from any inconsistent subsets of size up to k. As the value of k increases, k-consistency
becomes more demanding, and any residual inconsistencies become less “blatant”. Full
consistency is the limiting case of k-consistency as k goes to infinity. Suppose we replace
the requirement of belief consistency with the following:
Belief k-consistency (for some fixed value of k). For every Cr in the domain of f ,
the belief set B = f(Cr) is k-consistent.
We then obtain a possibility result:
Theorem 4. Any threshold rule with a strict threshold of k 1k (or higher) for each propo-
sition satisfies universal domain, belief k-consistency, propositionwise independence, and
certainty preservation.55
The proof of this theorem, which we omit for brevity, is very similar to that of
Theorem 3 above. The key point is that a probabilistically coherent function Cr could
never assign a degree of belief greater than k 1k to each of k or fewer mutually inconsistent
propositions; the implied subjective probability of their conjunction would then have to
be greater than 0, which would violate probabilistic coherence. Like our other results,
Theorem 4 has an analogue in judgment-aggregation theory.
Background Result 4. Any qualified majority rule with a strict threshold of k 1k (or
higher) for each proposition satisfies universal domain, collective k-consistency, proposi-
tionwise independence, and unanimity preservation.56
54Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this point. On the preface paradox, see David C.
Makinson, “The Paradox of the Preface,” Analysis, XXV, 6 (June 1965) 205–207.
55As before, the highest admissible threshold in this theorem is a weak threshold of 1.
56List, “When to Defer to Supermajority Testimony” (op. cit.). Once again, the highest admissible
threshold in this theorem is a weak threshold of 1.
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In sum, agents who are prepared to settle for less-than-full consistency in their beliefs,
while still avoiding “blatant” inconsistencies, can safely use threshold rules with a su -
ciently high threshold.57
8.5 Relaxing universal domain
A fifth, more theoretical escape route from our impossibility result opens up if we relax
the desideratum of universal domain. Recall that universal domain requires the belief-
binarization rule to work for every well-defined degree-of-belief function. As the name
of the desideratum suggests, this ensures the binarization rule’s universal applicability.
If, however, we suitably restrict the domain of admissible degree-of-belief functions, we
can find a belief-binarization rule satisfying the other desiderata.
Suppose, for example, that a degree-of-belief function Cr is deemed admissible only
if it has the property that, for every minimally inconsistent subset Y of X, there is at
least one proposition p in Y with Cr(p)  12 . It then follows that even a permissive
binarization rule such as a “more-likely-than-not rule” (a threshold rule with a strict
threshold of 12 for all propositions) will never generate an inconsistent belief set B. If
B were inconsistent for some Cr in the restricted domain, then B would have to have
some minimally inconsistent subset Y , which, in turn, would have to contain at least one
proposition p for which Cr(p)  12 (as Cr is in the restricted domain). But then p would
not be accepted under a threshold rule with a strict threshold of 12 . More generally, if we
admit only credence functions with the property that, for every minimally inconsistent
subset Y of X, there is at least one proposition p in Y with Cr(p)  t, then any threshold
rule with a strict threshold of t or above will guarantee consistency.
When translated into restrictions on admissible profiles of judgment sets in judgment-
aggregation theory, the domain restrictions just mentioned match the domain restrictions
required for the consistency of majority rule and supermajority rule with threshold t,
respectively.58 In judgment-aggregation theory, domain restrictions are often associated
with situations in which the group of individuals whose judgments are aggregated is
reasonably “cohesive”: disagreements among the individuals are limited. For example,
if a group engages in collective deliberation before voting, this might reduce any dis-
agreements, even if it does not produce a full consensus, and an aggregation rule with a
57For a critical discussion of the consistency requirement on belief, see also R. A. Briggs, Fabrizio
Cariani, Kenny Easwaran, and Branden Fitelson, “Individual Coherence and Group Coherence,” in
Jennifer Lackey, ed., Essays in Collective Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp.
215–39.
58See Franz Dietrich and Christian List, “Majority Voting on Restricted Domains,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, CXLV, 2 (March 2010): 512–43.
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restricted domain may become applicable. This is in fact a much-discussed idea of de-
liberative democracy.59 In belief-binarization theory, it is harder to justify the required
domain restrictions in a non-ad-hoc way. Still, it is worth acknowledging the theoretical
possibility of satisfying our other desiderata (apart from universal domain) if the agent’s
degree-of-belief function falls into a su ciently restricted domain.
8.6 Relaxing certainty preservation
As we have noted, a final logically possible escape route from our impossibility result
is to relax certainty preservation. However, this escape route is of little interest. First,
certainty preservation is a very undemanding and plausible requirement and thus hard
to relax. Second, even if we were prepared to give it up, this would not get us very far.
For a large class of proposition sets X, we would still be faced with an impossibility
result. To state this result, call a proposition p an atom of X if, for every proposition q
in X, p entails exactly one of q or ¬q. Further, call the proposition set X atom-closed if
it contains an exhaustive set of atoms.60 It is easy to see that any finite proposition set
X that forms an algebra is atom-closed. The following result holds:
Theorem 5. For any atom-closed proposition set X that contains more than one contin-
gent proposition-negation pair, any belief-binarization rule satisfying universal domain,
belief consistency and completeness, and propositionwise independence is constant : it
delivers as its output the same fixed belief set B, no matter which degree-of-belief func-
tion Cr is fed into it as input.
Of course, such a binarization rule is totally useless. According to it, the agent’s binary
beliefs are completely unresponsive to his or her degrees of belief. Like our earlier results,
Theorem 5 is a corollary of an analogous theorem on judgment aggregation.
Background Result 5. For any atom-closed proposition setX that contains more than
one contingent proposition-negation pair, any judgment-aggregation rule satisfying uni-
versal domain, collective consistency and completeness, propositionwise independence,
and consensus preservation is either dictatorial or constant.61
59See, for example, Christian List, Robert C. Luskin, James S. Fishkin, Iain McLean, “Deliberation,
Single-Peakedness, and the Possibility of Meaningful Democracy: Evidence from Deliberative Polls,”
Journal of Politics, LXXV, 1 (January 2013): 80–95.
60Formally, X is atom-closed if the set {¬p 2 X : p is an atom of X} is inconsistent.
61Dietrich, “Judgment Aggregation: (Im)Possibility Theorems” (op. cit.). For a related result, see
Pauly and van Hees, “Logical Constraints on Judgement Aggregation” (op. cit.).
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It is fair to conclude, then, that the relaxation of certainty preservation o↵ers no
compelling escape route from our impossibility result.
9 Concluding Remarks
We have investigated the relationship between degrees of belief and binary beliefs through
the lens of judgment-aggregation theory. We have proved a baseline impossibility theo-
rem, which turns out to be a sibling of Arrow’s classic impossibility theorem on prefer-
ence aggregation. The two results are each corollaries of a single, mathematically more
general impossibility theorem on judgment aggregation, as illustrated in Figure 1 above.
The message of our analysis is that the possibilities of expressing beliefs as a function
of degrees of belief are very limited. Any such possibility requires the relaxation of at
least one of our four baseline desiderata, and in each case this comes at a cost:
(i) If we relax universal domain, we must use a binarization rule that does not work
for all possible degree-of-belief functions and hence is not universally applicable.
(ii) If we relax belief consistency and completeness, then, depending on whether or not
we still retain implication-closure, we must either use an extremely conservative
acceptance criterion for every proposition, namely a degree-of-belief threshold of 1,
or live with violations of implication-closure or consistency. Suitable threshold rules
can, however, satisfy belief consistency and closure under implication by singletons.
(iii) If we relax propositionwise independence, we must accept a holistic relationship
between degrees of belief and beliefs, whereby an agent’s belief in one proposition
may be a↵ected by changes in his or her degrees of belief in others. We suggest
that embracing this holism (which Leitgeb describes as “a strong form of sensitivity
of belief to context”) is still the most palatable way to avoid our impossibility
result, and it is supported by the existence of certain relevance relations betweens
propositions. Indeed, several established proposals on belief binarization give up
independence.62
(vi) If we relax certainty preservation, finally, we face another negative result: for a
large class of proposition sets, the only binarization rules satisfying the other three
desiderata are constant rules, under which the agent’s beliefs are not responsive at
all to his or her degrees of belief.
62For example, Chandler, “Acceptance, Aggregation and Scoring Rules” (op. cit.), Leitgeb, “The Sta-
bility Theory of Belief” (op. cit.), and Lin and Kelly, “Propositional Reasoning that Tracks Probabilistic
Reasoning” (op. cit.) and “A Geo-logical Solution to the Lottery Paradox” (op. cit.).
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If pressed to choose one of these escape routes from our impossibility result, we would opt
for (iii) or (ii). However, for those who are reluctant to embrace any of these possibilities,
a natural conclusion may be that the search for a simple formal relationship between
degrees of belief and binary beliefs is futile.
The most radical version of this conclusion would be the denial that agents really
have both kinds of belief. Extreme Bayesians, for instance, might hold that agents have
no binary beliefs. On that view, beliefs always come in degrees, and “full belief” is, at
most, the limiting case in which the degree of belief is 1. The opposite view would be
that degrees of belief are theoretical constructs of probability theory and that, in reality,
agents have only binary beliefs. On this picture, degrees enter at most in the content
of a belief. An agent might have a full belief in the proposition that the probability
of another proposition is x. Here, the attitude towards the “outer” proposition is an
all-or-nothing attitude, which does not come in degrees; it just so happens that that
proposition asserts a probability assignment to another proposition, the “inner” one.
A less radical conclusion would be that agents have degrees-of-belief as well as binary
beliefs, but that the two kinds of belief may come apart and are not related in any simple
way: they may be two distinct aspects of an agent’s credal state, neither of which is
determined by the other. To defend that picture, one would have to say more about
what such a multi-faceted credal state would look like—a topic well beyond the scope of
this paper.63
What we can conclude is that, if one is unwilling to relax the standard consistency
and closure requirements on binary beliefs, then the prospects for expressing those beliefs
as a propositionwise function of degrees of belief are extremely slim. The binary belief
on a proposition may not generally supervene on the degree of belief in that proposition
alone. Our aim has been to lay out some salient impossibilities and possibilities of belief
binarization, and to o↵er a systematic analysis of the relevant logical space, in the hope
that this exercise will inspire further exploration.
Appendix
The judgment-aggregation variant of Arrow’s theorem and its corollary
for belief binarization
We now state Background Result 1 and Theorem 1 in full generality. As noted, the
significance of the fully general background result lies in the fact that it is the judgment-
63For a recent relevant discussion, see Easwaran and Fitelson, “Accuracy, Coherence and Evidence”
(op. cit.).
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aggregation variant of Arrow’s impossibility theorem.64 While in the simplified expo-
sition in Section 6 we required the proposition set X to be a non-trivial algebra, we
now merely require it to be what we call “strongly connected”. A proposition set X is
strongly connected if it has the following two combinatorial properties, which are jointly
weaker than the previous requirement that X be a non-trivial algebra:
Path-connectedness. For any two contingent propositions p, q in X, there exists a
path of conditional entailments from p to q (as explicated in a footnote).65
Pair-negatability. There exists a minimally inconsistent subset Y of X which contains
two distinct propositions p and q such that replacing p and q with ¬p and ¬q renders Y
consistent.66
Many di↵erent proposition sets are strongly connected in this sense. A simple exam-
ple is the set X consisting of p, q, p ^ q, p _ q, and their negations.67 Another example
is a set X consisting of binary ranking propositions of the form “x is preferable to y”,
“y is preferable to z”, “x is preferable to z”, and so on, where x, y, z, ... are three
or more electoral options, as discussed in Section 7. A third example, familiar from
the main text, is a set X which constitutes an algebra with more than one contingent
proposition-negation pair. The judgment-aggregation variant of Arrow’s theorem, in full
generality, can now be stated as follows:
Background Result 1 (fully general version). For any strongly connected propo-
sition set X, any judgment-aggregation rule satisfying universal domain, collective con-
64It comes from our own previous work on judgment aggregation and that of Elad Dokow and Ron
Holzman as well as Klaus Nehring and Clemens Puppe. All references are in the following footnotes.
65The property of path-connectedness was originally introduced by Nehring and Puppe in a di↵erent
formalism under the name “total blockedness”; see “Abstract Arrowian aggregation” (op. cit.). Formally,
a proposition p conditionally entails a proposition q if there exists some subset Y of X, consistent with
each of p and ¬q, such that {p}[Y entails q. A path of conditional entailments from p to q is a sequence
of propositions p1, p2, ..., pk in X with p1 = p and pk = q such that p1 conditionally entails p2, p2
conditionally entails p3, ..., and pk 1 conditionally entails pk.
66Formally, Y \{p, q} [ {¬p,¬q} is consistent. The property of pair-negatability was introduced, in
di↵erent variants, by Dietrich in “A generalised model of judgment aggregation” (op. cit.), Dietrich and
List in “Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation” (op. cit.), and Dokow and Holzman in “Aggregation
of binary evaluations” (op. cit.). The latter authors use the name “non-a neness”.
67To prove path-connectedness, note that, from any one of these propositions, we can find a path of
conditional entailments to any other (for example, from p to q via p _ q: p entails p _ q, conditional
on the empty set; and p _ q entails q, conditional on {¬p}). To prove pair-negatability, note that the
minimally inconsistent set Y = {p, q,¬(p^ q)} becomes consistent if we replace p and q with ¬p and ¬q.
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sistency and completeness, propositionwise independence, and consensus preservation is
dictatorial.68
Put di↵erently, whenever X is strongly connected, there exists no non-dictatorial
aggregation rule satisfying the four desiderata. It should be clear from our earlier dis-
cussion that this result has a direct corollary for belief binarization, which can be derived
in exact analogy to the main-text version of Theorem 1 above. The non-existence of any
non-dictatorial judgment-aggregation rule for X satisfying the four desiderata implies
the non-existence of any anonymous such rule. Since any belief-binarization rule for X
satisfying our four binarization desiderata would induce such an aggregation rule, there
cannot exist a binarization rule of this kind. In sum, the following theorem holds:
Theorem 1 (fully general version). For any strongly connnected proposition set
X, there exists no belief-binarization rule satisfying universal domain, belief consistency
and completeness, propositionwise independence, and certainty preservation.
In what follows, we present a further refinement of this result, namely a characteriza-
tion of the minimal (necessary and su cient) conditions on the proposition set X under
which Theorem 1’s negative conclusion—the non-existence of any belief-binarization rule
satisfying the four desiderata—holds. Theorem 1 itself gives only a su cient condition
on X for that conclusion to hold, not a necessary condition.
Minimal conditions for the impossibility result on belief binarization
In the case of the judgment-aggregation variant of Arrow’s theorem, it is known that
the “strong connectedness” requirement on the proposition set X is not only su cient,
but also necessary for the theorem’s negative conclusion, as long as X is finite.69 In
other words, if the set X is either not path-connected or not pair-negatable, there exist
non-dictatorial judgment-aggregation rules satisfying the four desiderata; we no longer
face an impossibility.
68Dietrich and List, “Arrow’s Theorem in Judgment Aggregation” (op. cit.), and Dokow and Holzman,
“Aggregation of Binary Evaluations” (op. cit.). Both papers build on earlier work by Nehring and
Puppe, reported in “Abstract Arrowian Aggregation” (op. cit.). Dietrich and List proved the theorem
as stated in the main text (establishing a su cient condition for the dictatorship conclusion). Dokow
and Holzman proved in addition that, if X is finite, the two combinatorial properties of X are not only
su cient, but also necessary for the theorem’s conclusion to hold. Nehring and Puppe proved a closely
related theorem that imposes an additional monotonicity desideratum on the aggregation rule, but does
not require pair-negatability of X.
69Dokow and Holzman, “Aggregation of Binary Evaluations” (op. cit.), building on Nehring and
Puppe, “Abstract Arrowian Aggregation” (op. cit.).
40
Interestingly, the same combinatorial properties, while su cient for our impossibility
result on belief binarization, are not necessary for it. We can derive the impossibility
even under weaker assumptions about the proposition set X. This is because, as we
have seen, belief binarization corresponds to a particularly restrictive case of judgment
aggregation: the case of propositionwise anonymous aggregation. In the presence of this
special restriction, judgment aggregation also runs into an impossibility more easily.
Consider the following combinatorial property, which is weaker than path-
connectedness.
Blockedness. There is at least one proposition p in X such that there exists a path of
conditional entailments from p to ¬p and also a path of conditional entailments from ¬p
to p.70 (Paths of conditional entailments are defined as before.)
For example, the set consisting of p, q, p $ q, and their negations is blocked (with
$ understood as a material biconditional), while the set consisting of p, q, p ^ q, and
their negations is not.71 The following background result holds:
Background Result 6. There exist judgment-aggregation rules satisfying universal
domain, collective consistency and completeness, propositionwise independence, consen-
sus preservation, and anonymity for all group sizes n if and only if the proposition set
X is not blocked.72
We now use this result to the derive the following:
Theorem 6. For any proposition setX that is blocked, there exists no belief-binarization
rule satisfying universal domain, belief consistency and completeness, propositionwise in-
dependence, and certainty preservation. Conversely, for any finite proposition set X that
is not blocked, there exists such a belief-binarization rule.
Before we prove this result, it is worth commenting on its significance. The present
theorem establishes exact minimal conditions on X for the impossibility of belief bina-
rization to hold. To illustrate, even for a proposition set as simple as the one consisting
70This property was introduced by Nehring and Puppe in “Abstract Arrowian Aggregation” (op. cit.).
71To show that the first set is blocked, it su ces to observe that there exist paths of conditional
entailments from p to ¬p and back. To see the former, note that {p}[{p$ q} entails q, and {q}[{¬(p$
q)} entails ¬p. To see the latter, note that {¬p}[{p $ q} entails ¬q, and {¬q} [ {¬(p $ q)} entails
p. To show that the second set is not blocked, it su ces to observe that there is no path of conditional
entailments from ¬p to p, from ¬q to q, or from ¬(p ^ q) to p ^ q.
72Franz Dietrich and Christian List, “Propositionwise Judgment Aggregation: The General Case,”
Social Choice and Welfare, XL, 4 (April 2013): 1067–95. The result builds on Nehring and Puppe,
“Abstract Arrowian Aggregation” (op. cit.). The “if” claim assumes that the proposition set X is finite.
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of p, q, p $ q, and their negations, there exists no belief-binarization rule satisfying
our four baseline desiderata (because the proposition set is blocked). By contrast, for
the proposition set consisting of p, q, p ^ q, and their negations, there exists such a
rule (because the set is not blocked), although, as we explain below, the rule is fairly
“degenerate”. It would accept any proposition among p, q, and p ^ q if and only if the
agent assigns degree of belief 1 to it, and would accept its negation otherwise.
To prove Theorem 6, let us first assume that the proposition set X is blocked, and
suppose, contrary to Theorem 6, there exists a belief-binarization rule for X satisfying
all four desiderata. Call it f . We have seen that, for any group size n, f induces an
anonymous judgment-aggregation rule F , via the construction described in Section 5,
and this aggregation rule satisfies all four aggregation-theoretic desiderata. However,
the existence of such a judgment-aggregation rule contradicts Background Result 6. So,
there cannot exist a belief-binarization rule of the specified kind. This completes the
negative part of the proof.73
Conversely, let us assume that the proposition set X is finite and not blocked. The
following result holds:
Background Lemma 1. If the proposition set X is finite and not blocked, there exists
at least one consistent and complete subset B⇤ ✓ X which has at most one proposition
in common with every minimally inconsistent subset Y ✓ X.74
To illustrate, recall that the set X consisting of p, q, p ^ q, and their negations is
not blocked. Indeed, we can find a subset B⇤ ✓ X which has at most one proposition in
common with every minimally inconsistent subset Y ✓ X. Take B⇤ = {¬p,¬q,¬(p^q)}.
The minimally inconsistent subsets of X are firstly all the proposition-negation pairs,
with which B⇤ obviously has only one proposition in common, secondly the sets {¬p, p^
q} and {¬q, p^q}, with which B⇤ again has only one proposition in common, and finally
Y = {p, q,¬(p ^ q)}, with which B⇤ also has only one proposition in common.
To establish the existence of a belief-binarization rule satisfying all four desiderata,
we construct one such rule. Define f as follows. For every degree-of-belief function Cr
on X, let f(Cr) = B, where
B = {p 2 X : Cr(p) = 1 or [p 2 B⇤ and Cr(p) 6= 0]} ,
where B⇤ is as specified in Background Lemma 1. To give an intuitive flavour of this
binarization rule, let us interpret B⇤ as a “default belief set”. The present binarization
73Alternatively, some of the additional formal results in the second part of the Appendix could be
used to give a direct proof of this negative result.
74Nehring and Puppe, “Abstract Arrowian Aggregation” (op. cit.).
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rule then “accepts” a proposition p if and only if the agent assigns degree of belief 1 to
that proposition or the proposition belongs to the default set and the agent does not
assign degree of belief 0 to it. (This is in fact a special kind of non-uniform threshold
rule, with a strict threshold of 0 for all propositions in B⇤ and a weak threshold of 1 for
all other propositions.) Why does this binarization rule satisfy the four desiderata? Let
us begin with the desiderata that are easy to check:
• f satisfies universal domain because it is well-defined for every degree-of-belief
function on X.
• f satisfies propositionwise independence because, under its definition, the all-or-
nothing belief in any proposition p (that is, whether or not p is in B) depends only
on the degree of belief in p (that is, Cr(p)), not on the degree of belief in other
propositions.
• f satisfies certainty preservation because, for any degree-of-belief function Cr that
assigns extremal degrees of belief (0 or 1) to all propositions in X, the definition
of f ensures that B contains all propositions p in X for which Cr(p) = 1 and does
not contain any for which Cr(p) = 0.
• f satisfies belief completeness because, for every degree-of-belief function Cr and
every proposition-negation pair p, ¬p in X, one of the two propositions always
satisfies the criterion for membership in B = f(Cr).
Finally, to see that f satisfies belief consistency, suppose, for a contradiction, that B =
f(Cr) is inconsistent for some degree-of-belief function Cr on X. Then B, being a
finite inconsistent set of propositions, has at least one minimally inconsistent subset Y .
By Background Lemma 1, at most one proposition in Y occurs in B⇤. Consider first
the case in which there is no such proposition. For all propositions q in Y , it then
follows immediately that Cr(q) = 1; otherwise those propositions could not have met
the membership criterion for B (of which Y is a subset). But since Cr is probabilistically
coherent, the fact that Cr(q) = 1 for all q in Y contradicts the inconsistency of Y . So let
us turn to the alternative case in which exactly one proposition in Y occurs in B⇤. Call it
p. For all propositions q in Y distinct from p, it follows again that Cr(q) = 1; otherwise
those propositions could not have met the membership criterion for B (of which Y is a
subset). But since Y is inconsistent and Cr is probabilistically coherent, the fact that
Cr(q) = 1 for all q in Y distinct from p implies that Cr(p) = 0, and so p cannot meet
the membership criterion for B, a contradiction. This completes our proof that f does
indeed satisfy the four desiderata on belief binarization.
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To emphasize, we do not claim that f is a substantively interesting binarization rule.
The point of its construction is merely to show that, if the set X violates the property
of blockedness, the impossibility result of Theorem 6 no longer goes through.
Some additional formal results
In this final section, we prove some additional formal results to give some further insights
into the consequences of our desiderata on the belief-binarization rule f . We have already
relied on one of these insights (about themonotonicity of f) in one of our earlier proofs (in
Section 8.1). Moreover, the present results allow us to establish some facts about belief
binarization “directly”, that is, not as corollaries of background results on judgment
aggregation.
Let f be a belief-binarization rule satisfying propositionwise independence. This
implies that, for every proposition p in X, the question of whether or not p is included
in the belief set B depends only on the degree of belief in p. For each proposition p, let
Cp be the set of those credence values in [0, 1] for which p is accepted into B, that is,
Cp = {x 2 [0, 1] : p 2 f(Cr) for some admissible Cr with Cr(p) = x}.
Call the elements of Cp the acceptance credences for p. We can then represent f in terms
of the family (Cp)p2X of sets of acceptance credences:
for any admissible Cr, f(Cr) = {p 2 X : Cr(p) 2 Cp}.
Claim 1. If f satisfies, in addition, universal domain and certainty preservation,
then, for every proposition p in X (where p 6= Ø), we must have 1 2 Cp.
To see this, consider any {0,1}-valued degree-of-belief function Cr such that Cr(p)=1.
Since p 6= Ø, a well-defined (that is, probabilistically coherent) such degree-of-belief
function exists, and since f satisfies universal domain, Cr is in the domain of f . Certainty
preservation then implies that p must be contained in B = f(Cr), and hence 1 2 Cp.
Claim 2. If f satisfies, in addition, implication-closure, then, for any two proposi-
tions p, q in X, if p conditionally entails q, then every acceptance credence for p is also
an acceptance credence for q, and thus Cp ✓ Cq.
To show this, suppose p conditionally entails q, and x is an acceptance credence for
p. Because of this conditional entailment, there exists a subset Y ✓ X, consistent with
each of p and ¬q, such that {p} [ Y entails q. It is easy to see that {p, q} [ Y and
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{¬p,¬q}[Y are each consistent sets. For this reason, there exist well-defined degree-of-
belief functions Cr0 and Cr00 such that Cr0 assigns credence 1 to all the propositions in
the first set, and Cr00 assigns credence 1 to all the propositions in the second set. Since
any linear average of well-defined degree-of-belief functions is probabilistically coherent,
the degree-of-belief function Cr = xCr0 + (1   x)Cr00 is well-defined. Let B = f(Cr).
Note the following. First, we have p 2 B, because Cr(p) = x, and x is an acceptance
credence for p. Second, we have Y ✓ B, because Cr(r) = 1 for every r 2 Y , and 1 is an
acceptance credence for every proposition (by Claim 1). Finally, since {p}[ Y ✓ B and
{p}[ Y entails q, we must have q 2 B, because B is implication-closed. But Cr(q) = x;
so x is an acceptance credence for q too.
Claim 3. If f is as in Claim 2, then for any two propositions p, q in X that are
connectable, in both directions, by a path of conditional entailments, we have Cp = Cq.
This follows immediately from Claim 2. Note further that, if all contingent propo-
sitions connectable, in both directions, by a path of conditional entailments, then the
binarization rule f is representable by a single set C ✓ [0, 1] of acceptance credences,
which are applied to every proposition in X.
Claim 4. If f is representable by a single C and X is pair-negatable, then f is
monotonic, meaning that, for any x, y in [0,1] with y > x, if x is in C, then y is also
in C. This implies that f is a threshold rule with t = inf(C). The threshold is weak if
inf(C) 2 C and strict otherwise.
To prove this, consider some x in C, and consider any y > x. Suppose X is pair-
negatable. Then X has a minimally inconsistent subset Y in which we can find two
distinct propositions p, q such that Y \{p, q} [ {¬p,¬q} is consistent. Since the sets
Y \{q} [ {¬q}, Y \{p, q} [ {¬p,¬q}, and Y \{p} [ {¬p} are each consistent (the first
and last because of Y ’s minimal inconsistency), there exist well-defined degree-of-belief
functions Cr0, Cr00, and Cr000 that assign credence 1 to all propositions in the first set,
to all propositions in the second, and to all propositions in the third set, respectively.
Now consider the function Cr = xCr0 + (y   x)Cr00 + (1   y)Cr000. Because Cr is a
linear average of three well-defined degree-of-belief functions, Cr is itself a well-defined
degree-of-belief function. Let B = f(Cr). Since x 2 C, we must have p 2 B. Since all
elements of Y \{p, q} are assigned credence 1 by Cr and 1 2 C (by Claim 1), we must
have Y \{p, q} ✓ B. Since Y in its entirety is inconsistent, Y \{q} entails ¬q, and hence
B entails ¬q. By implication-closure of B, ¬q must be in B. But Cr(¬q) = y, and hence
y is in C, as required.
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